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FOREWORD 
The master thesis is a requirement towards the completion of a Master of Science in Business 
Administration at the University of Agder with specialization in International Management. 
The thesis is written on the topic; “the impact of private equity on firms in emerging markets: 
evidence from Ghana”. Specially we seek to find out how private equity funding impact 
recipients’ overall financial performance and how through corporate governance mechanisms 
such financial performance may be affected. 
We include reflective notes which is in line with the three broad themes (internationalisation, 
innovation and responsibility) of University of Agder. The themes are deemed important for 
Business Administration’s professionals. With the reflective notes, each one of us touches on 
how our topic and the main findings relate to the broad themes; internationalisation, 
innovation and responsibility. The reflective notes can be found in appendix III. 
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ABSTRACT 
In the last decade, most emerging markets have been associated with new investment 
opportunities and some growth prospects that attract private equity (hereafter, PE) investors. 
Regions with growing interest of PE investments include Africa and Asia. Research on PE 
impact on recipient firms in developed economies are voluminous and has proven that PE 
plays a remarkable role in firms’ success. Until now, such performance implications on firms 
in emerging markets are limited in study. Our study focuses on the impact of PE funding on 
financial performance of firms in emerging markets using Ghana as a case. Using data from 
both the investors and fund recipients of PE, we empirically assess how the presence and 
ownership stake of PE investors affect financial performance of recipient firms. We also 
investigate the influence of post-investment corporate governance mechanisms on the overall 
financial performance of the recipient firms. We find that, PE backed firms have relatively 
higher returns on equity (ROE) and growth rate than listed firms though the differences are 
not statically significant. Also, we find that recipient firms with higher PE ownership stake 
have high ROE and growth rate than recipient firms with lower PE ownership stake. These 
findings recapitulate that, though PE investment significantly affects the performance of 
recipient firms positively, the PE industry is still at a growing stage and young in most 
emerging markets hence long-term benefits of PE investments would take time to be realized. 
We also find that PE recipient firms that involve the founders in management irrespective of 
the stake acquired by the PE investors outperform listed firms in terms of ROE. Finding on 
the board size of the recipient firms proves that, large board size affects ROE negatively. We 
therefore conclude that infusion of PE funds, through minority or majority stake, invariably, 
has a positive influence on recipient firms’ financial performance but higher stake enhances 
such stimuli. Also, corporate governance mechanisms play a major role in enhancing the 
positive relationship between PE and financial performance of recipient firms. Our findings 
are robust and they are empirically and theoretically supported. The findings should however 
be generalized with caution. This is because, as literature suggests, performance 
improvements that result from PE may take time to be realized and institutional context may 
also limit the generalisability of the finding among emerging markets that have vast 
institutional differences from Ghana.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In this master thesis, we investigate how PE funding affects the financial performance of 
recipients in emerging markets through corporate governance mechanisms. There is a 
growing body of academic research on private equity (PE) funding and firm performance in 
developed economies. Some studies suggest that corporate governance mechanisms and 
legality have impact on PE performance (Cumming et al, 2004;2006; Bruton et al, 2010). 
Hence, we believe that such performance stimuli may also exist in emerging markets and may 
affect the financial performance of the PE recipient firms. In this regard, we seek to answer 
the following questions: Does PE funding affect the financial performance of recipient firms 
in emerging markets? Also, how can corporate governance mechanisms affect the financial 
performance of PE recipient firms? Despite the capital imbalance that is predominant in 
emerging markets in terms of PE fundraising and investment, there is the need for additional 
financing as there is continual positive economic growth rates for emerging markets from 
limited partners point of view (Groh et al, 2011; Klonowski, 2013). According to Emerging 
Market Private Equity Association (EMPEA), (2016), fund managers raised US$7.0 billion 
for emerging markets focused PE fund and deployed US$4.9 billion across all emerging 
markets in the first quarter of 2016. Although there has been a constant decline recently in PE 
fundraising and investment across emerging markets, such markets could offer many 
opportunities (International Finance Corporation (IFC), 2016). The infusion of PE funding 
and its impact on recipient firms may come with some questions for fund managers and 
policymakers. For fund managers and limited partners, the obvious questions should be, can 
they provide much benefits to the recipient firms? Policymakers such as governments and 
other organisations in the industry will usually be concerned with, is there the need for PE 
funding at all? Thus, in the end when our study has provided answers to these questions, they 
will be of importance to policymakers, limited partners including pension funds, fund 
managers, recipient firms and the PE industry as a whole. 
To help offer explanations, this study is based on the following theories; agency theory, 
corporate governance, institutional theory, and transaction cost theory. Classical publicly 
traded companies are characterised by the separation of ownership from control. Agency 
theory seeks to offer explanations to this separation as it may lead to poor performance. The 
poor performance could be as a result of agency problems which occur when difference exists 
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between the interest of top managers and that of owners (shareholders) of a company. Good 
corporate governance is imperative to improve companies’ performance when ownership is 
separated from control. Agency problem is common between recipient firms and fund 
managers due to information asymmetry (Kaplan Stömberg, 2003). Investors’ representation 
on boards and their active involvement in recipients’ management activities can help reduce 
the agency problem and increase performance. Through managers’ co-ownership and relative 
few board members, PE helps align the interest of entrepreneurs and fund managers which 
improves performance of recipient firms (Wruck, 2008; Jayhun, 2016). 
 
Although PE funding is projected to present recipients with superior performance, such 
efforts may be thwarted in markets with weak institutions. Institutions are said to be the rules 
of the game and companies play by it (North, 1990). When the political, social and economic 
structures of a country are good, uncertainties are reduced which facilitates good interactions 
(Bruton et al, 2004). Inadequate investor protection, legal and regulatory framework largely 
explain most of the problems encountered by PE investors in emerging markets (Leeds and 
Sunderland, 2003). Therefore, effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms depends on 
both the institutional frameworks and enforcement of laws in the host country (Munisi, 
Hermes & Randøy, 2014; Luio, Chao   & Yang, 2016). 
PE in emerging economies could offer many opportunities despite current turmoil in global 
markets.1 Cumming et al (2008), suggest that governance and the institutional framework of 
countries do affect PE performance. The expertise and board representation by PE investors 
also yield superior performance (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003). According to Wruck (2008), it 
is not only fund manager’s expertise and board representation, which lead to superior 
performance but also entrepreneur involvement/ co-ownership by management play a major 
role. As most of these findings were from developed markets, we seek to find out whether 
they can be replicated in emerging markets context? Most studies on PE in emerging markets 
(both on country basis and/or geographical blocs) tend to be theoretical based and review of 
literature but not on empirical studies. (see, Groh, 2009; Klonowski, 2011; Charvel, 2012; 
Klonowski, 2013). Hence empirical research focusing on how PE impact recipient firms’ 
financial performance in emerging markets remains unanswered. Also to the best of our 
knowledge, how corporate governance can impact the financial performance of recipient 
                                                        
1 http://www.ifc.org 
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firms are limited in literature. We seek to fill these gaps by answering the following research 
questions: 
1. How does Private Equity funding affect financial performance of firms in emerging 
economies? 
2. How does corporate governance affect the financial performance of recipient firms of 
private equity in emerging economies? 
Providing answers to these research questions is of utmost importance. This is because the 
effect may be different from those experienced by developed markets and may have 
implications for emerging markets. First, the study it will help fill the identified gap in 
literature relating to the impact of PE funding on recipient’s performance through corporate 
governance mechanisms. Second, the study will help provide empirical evidence on the effect 
of PE funding on firms emerging markets. This is because the effect may be different from 
those experienced by developed economies and may have implications for emerging 
economies. 
We employ hand-collected cross-sectional data as at 2015 from Ghana. Given the unknown 
status and relatively small nature of Ghana’s PE industry, a purposive sampling was used. 
Therefore, only the list of firms provided by the Ghana’s VCTF (Venture Capital Trust Fund) 
was included in the survey to avoid the tendency of using false information from “legally 
unrecognised” PE fund managers. The study surveyed the entire population of 5 fund 
managers and 28 investee firms recognised by the VCTF. We also use listed firms on the 
Ghana stock exchange as comparable where the financial performance measures of PE 
recipients were matched against that of the listed firms. 
The main variable of study is an accounting measure of performance; return on equity. We 
use a mixed methodology in analysing the data. By quantitative method we employ a 
bivariate correlation test and regression analysis. Subsequently we adopt qualitative 
techniques by summarizing themes from the interviews conducted. 
 
We find that PE funding has influence on overall financial performance of recipient firms. 
The ownership stake owned by PE investors has a positive significant impact on financial 
performance. The involvement of founders in management as corporate governance proxy, 
also strongly influences the financial performance of the recipient firms positively. 
Conversely, board size as another corporate governance proxy, has negative relationship with 
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PE recipient firms’ financial performance. The findings are also consistent with the summary 
of themes from both fund managers and recipients. Thus, we may conclude that the PE and 
recipient firms’ performance enhancement stimuli found in developed markets also exist in 
emerging markets but subjected to small board size and founder involvement in management. 
These findings are theoretically and empirically supported. However, the ability to generalise 
the findings to other emerging markets may be limited given the small sample size of 
recipients used in the analysis. 
We organise the rest of the study as follows. The relevance and background for the study are 
presented in chapter two. Chapter three focuses on the theories underlying our research, 
previous studies on the topic and the conceptual framework for the study. Chapter four deals 
with the data as well as the sampling and data collection techniques. Chapter five focuses on 
the research methodology where we present the procedures and methods for analysing the 
data. In chapter six, we present the findings from analysing the data. We discuss the findings 
of the study in chapter seven. Finally, we end the study in chapter eight where we present 
summary of findings, recommendations, suggestions for further studies and some limitations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND AND RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 
2.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, we discuss the relevance and general background of the study. We also justify 
why such a study is undertaken as well as the motivation behind the study. We also touch on 
some important topics relating to Ghana, the country of analysis. Finally, we touch on the gap 
that we seek to fill with this research and elaborate on some peculiar issues related to the 
study. 
 
2.1 Financial life cycle of firms 
Start-ups have difficulties in sourcing external finance because of information opacity 
(Huyghebaert & Van de Gucht, 2007). The most important and commonly used sources of 
finance therefore are personal savings of the firm owner, and finance from friends and family 
(Ullah & Taylor, 2007). But in most time, due to the limited capital availability especially in 
emerging market, firms are not able to exploit their potentials and discontinue operations in 
extreme cases (Cressy, 2006).  Berger & Udell (1998) contributed to the discussion of firm 
growth and funding sources with their growth continuum and finance model as shown in 
Figure 2.1. Venture capital and PE funding may be the next most desirable source of capital 
after the owners’ seed capital. PE and ventures capital funding come with less stringent 
requirements than banks and stock markets (Berger & Udell 1998). 
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Figure 2.1: Financial Life Cycle of Firms 
 
Source:  Berger and Udell (1998)  
 
2.2 Global private equity 
PE and venture capital as a financial model was first developed in the United States in 1946 
and has achieved significant success in its implementation (Ribeiro & Carvalho,2008). PE 
and venture capital have then been used interchangeably as their distinction is usually blurred 
(Wright et al., 2005). We would therefore be using them interchangeably in this research. PE 
has been defined by international bodies such as EMPEA and EVCA as the provision of 
equity funding to non-listed firms with high growth potentials ranging from a medium to long 
term horizons (Meles et al., 2014). According to Meles et al. (2014, p. 203), “venture capital 
and buyout, strictly speaking, are subset of PE and refers to equity investments made for the 
launch, early development or expansion of a business”.  PE serves as an important source of 
funding for start-ups, private middle-markets, financially distressed firms, as well as public 
firms in need of buyout financing (Penn et al, 1997; Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003). PE funding 
usually comes from institutional and retail investors, high net worth individuals, pension 
funds and insurance companies (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003) as well as development finance 
institutions who promote small and medium enterprises development in developing countries 
(Leeds & Sunderland, 2003; Casey, 2014).  Pension funds and insurance companies tend to be 
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the largest investors in the PE industry (Gilligan & Wright, 2014) due to the long-term nature 
of their funds held in trust of their fund owners. Eid, 2006; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2009; 
Naidech, 2013; Fang et al, 2015 therefore categorised PE funding into limited partnerships 
(partners with passive role by supplying only capital) and general partners (partners take 
active role and usually act on behalf of limited partners in deal selection, execution, 
monitoring and exiting making them liable for all debts of the partnership). It is the norm for 
the general partner to provide at least 1 percent of the total capital and the fund typically has a 
fixed life, usually ten years (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2009).  According to Leeds & Sunderland 
(2003), the cycle of PE is driven by the constant urge to figure out a profitable exit within a 
certain time frame. These exits can be done through secondary buyout, sale to a strategic 
investor and initial public offering (which according to empirical studies is the preferred 
option as it maximises the value of firms). The essence of PE as an investment vehicle and a 
spur for economic growth (Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Yeh, 2004; Sapienza, Manigart, & 
Vermeir, 1996; Achleitner & Klöckner, 2005; Kaplan, 1989; Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; 
Wright, Thompson, & Robbie, 1992; Jeng & Wells, 2000) has increased PE transactions 
worldwide (both in developed and emerging markets). 
 
From Figure 2.2, the total value of PE-backed buyout (PE investments) deals worldwide 
reached it peaked in the year 2007 but a drastic decline in 2008 and 2009. This has been 
mainly attributed to the global financial crisis which bedevilled most nations in 2008 (Meles 
et al., 2014). The industry however started picking up from the year 2010 with total buyout 
transactions of 239 billion US dollars. However, it can be said the growth was at a relatively 
slow rate. Total PE investment transactions globally amounted to 409 billion U.S. dollars in 
2015 where we see a significant turnaround in the industry (Statista, 2015). 
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Figure 2.2: Value of private equity-backed buyout deals worldwide from 2006 to 2015 
(in billion U.S. dollars) 
 
Source: Statista, 2015 
 
2.3 Private equity in Emerging markets 
Although the economic outlook for developed countries seems uncertain, some emerging 
economies presents some growth prospects (Klonowski, 2013). Despite the current decline in 
PE fundraising and investment across emerging markets, such markets could offer many 
opportunities (IFC, 2016). The robust development of PE in emerging markets is underscored 
in key statistics. According to EMPEA’s 2016 first quarter Emerging Markets Private Capital 
Industry Statistics, fund managers raised US$7.0 billion for emerging markets focused private 
funds in the first quarter of 2016. This shows a drop of 30% from the first quarter of 2015. 
Also, fund managers deployed US$4.9 billion and completed 341 investments, corresponding 
to a decline of 20% and 9% respectively across all emerging markets. Based on 2015 data, PE 
penetration (expressed as a ratio of private equity investment to GDP) in emerging markets is 
around 0.15 which is relatively low compared to the developed PE regions (U.K ;1.98 and 
U.S; 1.45). 
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Figure 2.3: Emerging Market (EM) Private Equity Fundraising & Investment as % of 
Global Total  
 
Source: EMPEA Industry Statistics, 2016: p 12 
Notwithstanding the capital imbalance that is predominant in this region in terms of PE 
fundraising and investment, from limited partners point of view, there is continual positive 
economic growth rates for emerging markets and hence there is the need for financing. (Groh 
et al, 2011; Klonowski, 2013).  According to Klonowski (2013), although there is a slowdown 
in overall economic development of emerging markets in recent years, GDP growth in these 
markets exceeds those in developed markets by a significant amount. Thus, emerging markets 
offer global investors the opportunity to diversify their global portfolios, to generate higher 
returns as well as participate in the economic turnaround of the world economy. Weak legal 
systems for investor protection, low corporate governance and weak capital markets in 
emerging economies are the dominant factors affecting capital attraction and investment 
activities in these countries compared to those of advanced economies (Leeds & Sunderland, 
2003; Groh, 2009; Makhene, 2009; Klonowski, 2013). 
The PE industry is set to transform emerging markets, markets which have already gone 
through their initial "teething" problems (Klonowski, 2011). There is therefore the need to 
advance research in PE in emerging economies to asses as to how best good corporate 
governance mechanisms can help improve the anticipated returns in the region. Our study will 
have practical implications for fund managers, investors and recipient firms. 
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2.4 Private equity in Africa 
Most countries in Africa are bedevilled with generally shallow, inefficient capital markets and 
nascent stock exchanges (Bruce & Piesse, 2013) and PE could be the perfect asset class for 
investors in the continent. 2  Investors are confident that, Africa remains a strong growth 
opportunity and more attractive in terms of PE investment3. In effect, African PE markets 
have grown exponentially in terms of fundraising during the past decade despite their history 
of roller coaster in the past six years as depicted in the figure below. 
 
Figure 2.4: Total value of Africa Private Equity fundraising, by year of final close, 
US$bn     
 
Source:  APEVCA; African Private Equity Data Tracker, (2016- first quarter; p 1) 
 
There has been ups and down in the value of fundraising in the content. Figure 2.5 shows a 
19% growth in 2011, a reduction of 24% in 2012, a rise of 84% in 2013, a reduction of 43% 
in 2014 and a tremendous increased rise of 115% in 2015. All thing being equal, the 
US$1.1bn funds raised in the first quarter of 2016 signifies only 2% growth in 2016 (if 
quarterly funds raised remains constant throughout the year). The projection for funds in 2016 
and 2017 were relatively lower due to the; current uncertainty around African emerging 
markets, low commodity prices and depreciating local currencies (APEVCA report, 2015). 
Notwithstanding the ill projections, Boston Consulting Group (BCG) in their 2016 report on 
PE in Africa stated that “African continent remains ripped and will continue to offer higher 
returns on private investments”. There is a growing presence of large funds and principal 
                                                        
2 Boston Consulting Group private equity report, (2016). Why Africa remains ripe for private equity 
3 (Ernst & Young, industry report on private equity in Africa, 2016) 
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investors which has broaden the market, thus making it relatively easier for existing investors 
to divest as compared to the past twenty years4. On exits, an average of 40 exits by PE funds 
was witnessed in 2013, 2014 and 2015 compared to an average of 29 in the previous five 
years (APEVCA report, 2015). Leeds and Sunderland 2003; Lieber, 2004; Gompers & 
Lerner; 2004 and Weber, 2006, on exits argued that, PE cycle is driven by the constant urge to 
figure out a profitable exit within a certain time frame hence increasing exit opportunities in 
PE market is a sign of a good investment. Buttressing this with investors quest in seeking 
quality deals all over the continent has triggered the interest of equity investors in other non-
traditional PE investment destinations especially in West and East region of the continent.5 
 
Effort has been made by both government and non-governmental agencies in improving the 
investment climate especially in; Tanzania, Botswana, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda, 
Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Mali.6 Nevertheless, the investment environment in these 
emerging markets are still not without challenges. PE firms continue to struggle with lack of 
quality deal flows, human capital challenges, lack of sophistication in potential acquisitions 
and portfolio companies partly due to institutional inefficiencies and unstable macro-
economic factors (APEVCA, 2015). Largely, we say the picture of PE in Africa’s emerging 
economies is positive and investors are optimistic about favourable returns.  
 
In our case, we   focus on the western region of the continent which has gained more attention 
of investors. BCG private report (2016) stated that, West Africa will be the most attractive 
investment destination in the few years. Figure 2.6 depicts a survey by Deloitte on investors’ 
confidence and attractiveness of the countries in West Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 African Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (APEVCA) report, 2015. 
5 Deloitte Africa private equity confidence survey, (2016) 
6 World Bank Report on Ease of doing business in East and Sub-Saharan Africa, (2017) 
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Figure 2.5. Country focus for 2015 and 2016 (Private equity investors percentage score 
on investment destinations attractiveness in West Africa) 
 
Source: (Deloitte Africa private equity confidence survey, 2016.) 
 
Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy was the most favourite country but has been consistently 
lowered in terms of growth forecast by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) due to the 
decline in oil prices and the political instability which has negatively affected the country’s 
investment attractiveness (APEVCA 2016).  Investors focus may be shifting to other 
countries such as Ghana as shown in figure 2.6 being the next best investment destination in 
the region. This can be attributed to Ghana’s political stability, abundant natural resources, 
growing consumer market which enhancing investment diversification and consistency of 
returns (Deloitte Africa PE confidence survey, 2016).  Moreover, there is limited flow of 
international and syndicated PE capital coupled with the absence of angel investors and 
inefficient stock market (VCTF, 2015). Thus, it can be concluded that there is a big space in 
the country for foreign PE investors (Gatsi & Nsenkyire, 2010). These opinions confirm the 
position of Ghana among her peers in terms of investors’ confidence but certain perennial 
questions remain unanswered.  Will the increased levels of confidence and capital deployment 
by PE investors impact the financial performance of recipient firms positively? Or are 
investors concerned about their higher returns? And, what are the opportunities in these 
countries for western based investors that are unidentified and/or unexploited? 
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2.5.1 Overview of the economy of Ghana 
The analysis under this section is based on our field work and the empirical findings of the 
U.S. Department of State’s Investment Climate Statements in Ghana from 2010 to 2016 
which observed the Ghanaian economy empirically from various angles. Ghana until recently 
when the country’s GDP growth rate slowed in 2015 to 3.9 %, was among the world's fastest 
growing economies. The country’s high dependence on the exportation of primary 
commodities (including; gold, cocoa, oil and other agricultural products) makes the economy 
highly vulnerable to commodity price shocks. Ghana’s economy deteriorated between the 
years of 2013 and 2016. Inflation hit 19.2% in the first quarter of 2016 (the highest since early 
2010) and the Ghanaian currency (cedi) has been depreciating since 2013 (lost almost 32 
percent of its value in 2014 and slid another 15 percent in 2015). Unemployment stood at 
5.2% as at 2014 (Ghana Statistical Service report, 2015). To stabilize Ghana’s struggling 
economy, various credit facilities have been extended to the country with the aim of boosting 
firms at the start-up and growth stages. The three-year $918 million extended credit from the 
IMF in 2015 is an example. On the negative side, this shot Ghana’s debt to GDP rising ratio 
above 70 percent. On energy and productivity, the nation suffered severe power outages in 
2015 which extended to the ending of 2016 and has negatively affected businesses especially 
the small and medium enterprises in the private sector. 
 
Prospects for Ghana’s economy look brighter despite current macro-economic challenges. 
Hinging on positive outcomes from the oil sector and the IMF fiscal consolidation program, 
Ghana’s macro-economic indicators are beginning to stabilize. Private sector productivity is 
expected to increase as processes to meliorate the power outage issues are on track. Backed 
by a strong services sector performance, Ghana’s economy grew by 4.9% during the first 
quarter of 2016 which was higher than the 4.1% recorded in the first quarter of 2015.  The 
inflation rate which was hovering around 18% in the first quarter of 2016 fell to 16.7% in July 
and has been the lowest since March 2015. The GDP growth rate is projected to reach around 
7.5% by 2018.7. Also, capital markets and portfolio investment are gradually evolving8  
 
The current government administration acknowledges Ghana’s yawning fiscal deficit and lack 
of availability of capital for potential private start-up businesses and sees infusion of foreign 
funds through PE investment as a necessity in enhancing economic growth. Ghana offers 
                                                        
7 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ghana 
8 U.S. Department of State’s Ghana’s Investment Climate Statement (2015) 
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investors a business environment with features such as a stable and predictable political 
environment, non-discrimination against foreign investors, free-floating exchange rate regime 
and guarantees that investors can transfer profits out of Ghana, investment laws that protect 
investors against expropriation and nationalization, and lower degree of corruption than that 
of some regional counterparts. Among the promising sectors are agribusiness, financial 
sector, education, food processing, downstream oil, gas, and minerals processing, as well as 
the energy and mining-related services subsectors. Overall, the investment climate in Ghana is 
relatively welcoming to foreign investment as well as enhancing firm’s performance of both 
foreign and local business, especially compared to other countries in the sub-region 9 . 
However, burdensome bureaucracy (e.g. stringent local content regulations in the petroleum 
sector), costly financial services, under-developed infrastructure, ambiguous property laws, 
frequent power and water cuts, and an unskilled labour force are the main factors that hinder 
the growth of both foreign and private businesses in Ghana (U.S Department of State’s 
Ghana’s Investment Climate Statement, 2015). 
  
2.5.2 Legal and institutional environment of Ghana vis à-vis corporate governance 
In assessing firm performance, the importance of legal traditions for corporate governance 
and economic growth in a country cannot be denied (Andreas, 2012). Ghana, been colonised 
by the British has a common law and customary law as basic legal systems on which all 
investment transactions are based.  Common-law countries have the strongest legal protection 
of minority shareholders, while investor protection is weakest in French civil-law countries 
(Hoskisson et al., 2004: Lerner and Schoar, 2005 and La Porta et al. 2000). However, it has 
been observed that, differences and similarities between specific countries should be 
explained considering additional factors than the legal traditions only (Andreas, 2012). In 
Ghana, the regulatory framework for an effective corporate governance practice in Ghana is 
contained in the Companies code 1963 (Act 179), Securities Industry Law 1993 (PNDCL 
333) as revised by the Securities Industry (Amendment) Act, 2000 (Act 590) and the listing 
regulations, 1990 (L.I. 1509) of the Ghana Stock Exchange. Corporate governance and 
minority’s interest protection is strong in listed firms but weak in unlisted firms leading to 
increase in agency cost and increasing dispute resolution at commercial courts (Agyemang & 
Castellini, 2015). Although it may be somewhat less, in Ghana there is evidence of 
government intervention in the court system and the courts being slow in disposing of cases 
                                                        
9 U.S Department of State’s Ghana’s Investment Climate Statement (2015) 
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(U.S. Department of State’s Ghana Investment Climate Statements, 2015). Corruption in 
Ghana is comparatively less prevalent than in other countries in the region10 but remains a 
problem as few American firms operating in Ghana have identified corruption as the main 
obstacle to foreign direct investment in the country (U.S. Department of State’s Ghana 
Investment Climate Statements, 2015). Nevertheless, Ghana’s track record of political 
stability and a relatively, reliable legal system results in dispute resolution processes that 
benefits foreign investors, in comparison to other countries in the region (U.S. Department of 
State’s Ghana Investment Climate Statements, 2015).  
 
2.5.3 Private equity industry in Ghana 
As in most emerging markets, Ghana’s SMEs serves as the backbone of the economy.  It has 
been estimated that SMEs comprise about 90% of all businesses in the country. Yet access to 
capital has been consistently cited as the major challenge faced by African SMEs (Aryeetey, 
1994) and SMEs in Ghana are no exception. The typical challenge is access to long term 
source of finance in terms of equity as funds from Banks and other Non-Bank Financial 
institutions are short term in nature. This therefore makes the sustenance of capital intensive 
sectors very critical. Over the years, the government has shown commitment through various 
financing programmes such the Export Development and Investment Fund (EDIF) to help 
salvage the perennial problem of access to finance for SMEs. These have however faced 
challenges such as strict regulations and lack of market support. 
 
Following the unsuccessful nature of most of the SMEs financing programmes, the 
government thus implemented the suggestion given by some Development Financial 
Institutions and local investors to help pass a formal legislation for financing schemes and 
help develop the supporting market infrastructure. This led to the passage of the Venture 
Capital Trust Fund Act (Act 680, 2004) with seed funding from the government through the 
National Reconstruction Levy and Act also allows the fund to source additional funding from 
private investors11. According to Venture Capital Trust Fund (VCTF) 2016 annual report, it 
has invested into 48 portfolio companies using a total of USD 14,213,454 of the venture’s 
committed capital.  The activities of the Trust Fund have boosted the role of PE in the country 
which promoted the influx of additional funding for SMEs both locally and overseas. Locally, 
the financial sector (e.g. Databank, Fidelity Bank, State Insurance Corporation) has 
                                                        
10 Transparency international Corruption Perceptions Index (2016) 
11 http://reports.weforum.org/social-innovation-2013/06-the-venture-capital-trust-fund-ghana/? 
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appreciated the role of PE by making availability equity funding to companies.  Foreign 
investors have also been increasingly active in the country with majority of them without any 
physical present (local offices). However, a few have physical present in Ghana by way of 
regional offices such as Aureos Capital and Kingdom Zephyr African Management. The 
foreign fund managers without local presence include Blackstone Group and Warburg Pincus 
who invested in an oil exploration firm known as Kosmos Energy and Actis International who 
made an invested in Accra Mall, a project estimated at USD 30 million. With regards to the 
foreign capital investments, most of them are geared towards the financial sectors. The later 
part of 2013, saw Abraaj Group buying a majority stake in Ghana Home Loan, a mortgage 
firm and in 2014 Petra Trust, a leading pension firm in Ghana received funding from 
Leapfrog. 
 
2.6 Private equity in Emerging markets research 
There is a growing research in PE investment. Most of these studies have focused on; the 
portfolio performance of fund investors in the industry in general (e.g. Bruton et al, 2010; 
Wruck, 2008; Hearn & Piesse, 2013), PE in general as catalyst for economic development in 
emerging economies (e.g. Eid, (2006 and Groh (2009), PE fund raising and investment 
analysis in the geographical blocks of emerging markets (Babarinde, 2012; Klonowski, 2013) 
and PE in specific countries in the emerging market regions (eg. Charvel, 2012; Klonowski, 
2011; Ribeiro & Carvalho, 2008).  
 
Most of these researchers have focused on the PE industry and corporate governance 
implication in the US and the UK while such research in emerging and developing economies 
such as Africa and Asia remains scanty, review based and less significant compared to those 
on developed economies except Hearn & Piesse (2013) and Leeds & Sunderland (2003). 
However, we deem it necessary that more research must focus on emerging economies in 
Africa as “the continent remains ripped and will continue to offer higher returns on private 
investments compared to similar investments in developed western economies” (Boston 
Consulting Group, 2015).  
 
With the limited amount of research on PE in emerging economies, most focused on a top-
down approach where researchers study the gross portfolio performance overtime amid 
corporate governance issues. Exited investments through initial public offerings are also 
usually considered. This situation however like Kaplan & Schoar (2005) opined is because of 
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the lack of availability of data because PE industry is largely exempted from publicly 
disclosing their activities. Thus, to the best of our knowledge there is no such research which 
has used a bottom-up approach on the interrelation between the impact of corporate 
governance implication on PE funding and the performance of recipients. Hence drawing on 
Ghana’s PE industry and using; agency theory and transaction cost theory, and institutional 
theory, we seek to provide an empirical evidence of the impact of PE investment on 
recipients. Recipients drawn from Ghana will serve as generalisation for recipients in 
emerging economies in Africa. Indeed, this will help fill the knowledge gap. Moreover, it will 
guide practitioners and other players in the PE industry to assess their projected confidence in 
the emerging economies.  
 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
Notwithstanding the predominance of capital imbalance in emerging markets in terms of PE 
fundraising and investment, limited partners opine that there is the need for financing as there 
is continual positive economic growth rates for emerging markets. Although research in PE is 
constantly being advance, studies focusing on the impact of PE funding impact performance 
in emerging economies remains unanswered as well as how corporate governance can impact 
private performance of recipient firms to the best of our knowledge. The relevance of our 
research is in two-folds. First, it will help fill the identified gap in literature relating to impact 
on PE funding on recipient’s performance through corporate governance mechanisms. 
Second, it will help provide empirical evidence on the effect of PE funding on recipients’ 
financial performance in emerging economies. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORY AND PREVIOUS FINDINGS 
3.0 Introduction 
In this section, we present the basic theories underlying our research as well as some 
empirical findings relating to the study. We would also present our research hypotheses and 
finally end with a conceptual framework for this research. 
 
3.1 Theories 
As theories provide researchers the opportunity to explain some occurrences and phenomena, 
we would basically rely on the following theories to offer explanations for our research; 
agency theory, transaction cost theory and institutional theory. We would also discuss 
corporate governance in this section. 
 
3.1.1 Agency theory 
An indispensable and the most common concept in the context of PE is the phenomenon of 
information asymmetry between the investor and the entrepreneur or managers of firms 
(Kaplan and Stömberg, 2003). Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) opined that, agency problems 
are the major source of tension between PE investors and entrepreneurs. Their finding is in 
line with the classic theory of agency including Stiglitz, 1974 and Grossman & Hart, 1983.  
These scholars opined that, there is a potential for conflict between the agent and the principal 
who both seek to maximize the task for their respective benefits. The cost associated with 
these agency problem is known as, agency cost (Shapiro, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Jensen & Meckling, (1976) grouped these cost into; “the monitoring expenditures by the 
principal, the bonding expenditures by the agent, and the residual loss”. This apprise investors 
to recognize costs related to separation of ownership and managerial control in the PE equity 
industry.  In the context of PE investments, the principal, can be generalised as the limited 
partner who invests capital in a project that is carried out by the general partner as agent, or 
the general partner whose project is carried out by the entrepreneur as agent (Raphael, 2011). 
Elaborating on these three types of agency relationship with respect to PE, Bygrave & 
Timmons (1992) and Cumming & Macintosh (2003) stated that, once ownership of the 
project is shared with the investor, both general partners and entrepreneurs as agent have an 
information advantage and an incentive to not always act in the best interests of the investor. 
In the quest of mollifying the effect of agency theory and it related cost, Spremann (1990) 
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classified agency theory into three main categories; adverse selection, moral hazards, hold ups 
and adverse selection. 
 
 Adverse selection occurs in markets or contracts where one party cannot differentiate 
between the good versus bad quality of the other due to asymmetric information 
(Spremann,1990). In the PE investment arena, two main scenarios explain this problem 
(Raphael, 2011). Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) and Gompers (1996) elaborated this in the 
following sentences. In PE funding, competition among entrepreneurs for equity funds pushes 
them to present optimistic forecast of favourable returns and gargantuan growth projection for 
their business whilst withholding negative information that can potentially if uncovered, ruin 
their attractiveness for the funds.  General partners, also in the quest to signal their ability of 
bringing recipients to the capital market sooner than other older PE firms, and moreover to 
establish a reputation, they fail to embark on background checks on the new recipient firms.  
 
The second and third categories of agency are; moral hazard and holdups. Moral hazard was 
first identified by the economist and philosopher Adam Smith in his book “The Wealth of 
Nations” (Smith & Garnier, 1838). Spreman (1990) articulated that this problem can arise in 
two ways; when an agent uses hidden information and/or hidden action at the blind side of the 
principal to increase their own utility at the detriment of the principal’s best interest. A private 
equity investor, as the principal, cannot monitor fully the behaviour of the agent but only 
examine the firm’s most pressing goals and ultimate success. Different control system such as 
pre-contractual screening of potential investments and post-contractual monitoring and 
incentive-settings are array of governance mechanisms that investors in their capacity as 
principals use to allay most of the latent agency problems (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004; 
Koryak & Smolarski, 2008). But Milgrom and Roberts (1992) stated that, the cost of perfect 
monitoring is typically greater than the return from the employees perfectly monitored effort. 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976 suggest that, the higher and tighter the level of monitoring, the 
higher the costs incurred and hence, investors aim at keeping monitoring costs as low as 
possible. Hence, there is nothing like and would never be a perfect control mechanism in 
organisations (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). This suggest that, governance mechanisms 
including board composition and founder involvement may play critical role in aligning 
investors and owners interest as well as overall performance of PE recipient firm. Holdup 
occurs when agent through systematic approaches use gaps and deficiencies in contracts 
(Raphael, 2011). The opportunistic behaviour of the human nature and human not been 
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immune to bounded rationality will naturally make future contracts incomplete in one way or 
the other. Agents in their selfish interest reveals their previously hidden intentions and call for 
renegotiation as soon as investors deploy the initial funds and after sunk costs have been 
incurred (Spremann, 1990). From the agency theory perspective, the equity investors can and 
may outline complete contractual agreement. But as Fama & Jensen, (1983) opined, full 
contract formulation and enforcement may exceed the benefits secured from the agent’s tasks. 
 
3.1.2 Corporate governance 
Agency problems and governance move in tandem with the former being a pulling string on 
the latter as highlighted in the discussions of the preceding categories of agency theory 
(Thomsen, 2008). Separation of ownership and control leading to agency problems makes 
corporate governance mechanisms a necessity (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Thomsen, 2008). The 
intertwined relationship between these phenomena is dated back to the work of Adam Smith 
in his book “The wealth of Nations”, he observed that “the directors of such companies, 
however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well 
be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private co-partnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich 
man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and 
very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a 
company” (Smith & Garnier, 1838, p. 311) and hence a good governance is often needed as a 
counteragent to this problem (Thomsen, 2008). When investors finance a firm, they 
conventionally obtain certain rights that are generally protected through the enforcement of 
regulations and laws (La Porta et al., 2000). But Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Hart (1995) 
state that, principal and agent interest could diverge even during legal enforcement, and 
investors protection through legal systems may turn out to be ineffective.  Expropriation of 
investors by the controlling management can therefore be extensive. La Porta et al., (1998) 
state that investors face risk, and sometimes near certainty that the returns on their 
investments will never be materialize in inefficient institutional environment. PE investors 
must therefore be on the edge of implementing extra controls to supplement the legal investor 
protections available which are to some extent country, institutional and industry specific (La 
Porta et al., 2000). The presence of equity investors on the recipient company’s board could 
therefore potentially align the interest of managers and that of investors (Berger et al., 2009). 
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On the contrary, García-Herrero & Santabárbara (2008) had an opposite opinion on the 
presence of investors on the beneficiary firm’s board. 
 
3.1.3 Transaction cost theory 
This theory forms part of the new institutional economics together with agency theory and 
property rights (Saam, 2007). After Oliver E. Williamson outlined the main determinants of 
transaction cost in his seminal book “Market and Hierarchies” in 1973 (Williamson, 1975), 
transaction cost economics has become an imperative in the study of management and 
organizations (David & Han, 2004). Williamson (1991) argued that, transaction cost theory is 
the ‘core theory’ of strategy and hence other increasing phenomena should be subsumed 
(Groenewegen & Vromen, 1996; David & Han, 2004), Scholars including Groenewegen & 
Vromen, 1996; Moran & Ghoshal, 1996; David & Han, 2004 has contributed to theory 
regarding the empirical validity and applicability of the theory in international business and 
cross border- activities. Williamson (1973) opines that, transaction cost exists mainly because 
of uncertainty, and opportunism, though bounded rationality is involved as well. It exists 
when true underlying circumstances relevant to the transaction, or related set of transactions, 
are known to one or more parties but cannot be costlessly discerned by others.  Transaction 
cost theory and agency cost theory and corporate governance are inseparable in the context of 
investment (David & Han, 2004). From the discussion of these three theories, it can be 
deduced that; (a) Transaction cost theory is an alternative variant of agency cost, 
understanding governance assumptions. That is transaction cost  governance frameworks are 
based on the net effects of internal and external transactions, rather than contractual 
relationships with shareholders. The corporate governance problem of transaction cost theory 
is the effective and efficient accomplishment of transactions by firms but not the protection of 
ownership rights. (b) Transaction cost theory and agency theory essentially deal with the same 
issues and problems but agency theory focuses on the individual agents and transaction cost 
theory focuses on the individual transactions. Search and information costs, bargaining and 
decision costs and policing and enforcement costs are situation under which transaction cost 
may occur (Leeds & Sunderland 2003) 
  
3.1.4 Institutional theory 
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990, p. 3). Institutions contribute 
immensely to locational advantages, the second component of the well-known ownership-
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location-internalization (OLI) paradigm which explains the pattern of foreign direct 
investment (Dunning,1998; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005).  Scholars including Scott (1987), 
Williamson (1995) and Shirley (2005) state that, these rules of the game are both formal and 
informal elements made up of economic, political and social institutions put in place to 
structure and promote an enabling environment in which people and businesses prosper. 
Efficient institutions reduce uncertainties and establish stable structures that facilitate 
interactions thereby reducing both transaction and information costs (Bruton et al., 2004; 
Kingsley & Graham 2017). In places where institutions increase the certainty that contracts 
will be honoured and property protected, individuals will be more willing to specialize, invest 
in sunk assets, undertake complex transactions and accumulate and share knowledge North 
(1990; Williamson, 2000). Implicitly, agency cost is minimal and governance becomes 
lenient in firms operating in countries rooted in quality institutions. Investors knowledgeable 
about the host country’s institutional build-up therefore is indispensable prior to negotiations 
and funds commitment. Also, Bell et al. (2012) adds that, the larger the institutional 
knowledge gap, the higher the liability of foreignness and the additional cost of doing 
business in the host country. Scott (1995) and Bruton et al. (2004) emphasis that institutional 
components are categorised into; regulatory, normative and cognitive aspects and in sum, 
shapes all activities of an originations. 
 
Laws and sanctions regulating firms and individual’s behaviour in an environment are 
classified as the regulatory elements (North, 1990). These regulatory institutions are based on 
legal philosophy, degree of legal protection for investors, law enforcement and the nature of 
capital market system in respective countries and therefore differs around the world (Bruton, 
Fried, & Manigart 2005). Leeds and Sunderland (2003) cited inadequate investors protection 
and legal and regulatory framework as the major reasons for the problems encountered by PE 
funds entering emerging markets. Therefore, the development of PE industry in emerging 
economies is undoubtedly affected by the level of investor protection regulations (Bruton et 
al., 2005; Kingsley & Graham, 2017). This can be buttressed with the assertion of Bruton et 
al., (2003) stating that, PE industry development in a country is due not only to the existence 
of laws but also to their strict enforcement. 
 
The normative aspect of institution are the derivational actions, acceptable behaviour and 
values from professional standards that are propagated through training and constant practice 
(DiMaggio, 2001). Many players in the PE industry in emerging economies have studied and 
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worked in Western institutions where they received their training and hence, normative 
practices in the PE industry in emerging economies are strongly influenced by Western ideas 
(Bruton, et al., 2002).  Wright et al., (2005) state that, venture capital companies from United 
States entering foreign markets adapts their way of working to certain degree. This buttress 
the dominant normative logic of PE as a financial model originating from the United States 
with its strong values and norms (Bruton et al., 2005) but also implies that, host countries 
environments are equally imperative. 
 
Bruton et al., (2004) define cognitive element of institutions as the constraints concretized in 
traditions that are subconsciously accepted as rules and customs, and commercial conventions 
that develops over time through social interactions among the various participants which 
shape their notions of what is appropriate and conceivable behaviour. Relevant elements 
impounded in the definition that are of greatest concern for PE investors are the differences in 
the cognitive value and roles placed on entrepreneurship and social networks respectively 
(Bruton et al., 2005). Raphael, (2011) suggests that, the differentiating factor between the 
United States and some European countries is the status attached to entrepreneurship. While 
entrepreneurs with US traits are held in high regard (characterised with high rewards for 
success and low punishment for failure), in European countries entrepreneurs are typically 
seen as opportunists. (success does not necessarily confer high status and failure has major 
negative implications) Raphael, (2011). On social network, Raphael, (2011) opines that, 
connections between business people in most European countries are stronger than in the U.S. 
and even stronger in Asia. Ascribed entrepreneurship roles and network-based financing 
connections, is known to have an influence on managerial behaviour and performance of 
equity investment (Chen, 2002). 
 
Implementation of effective corporate governance mechanisms will reduce agency problems 
through effective monitoring. This enhance transparency and the accountability of decision-
making processes which turns to improve corporate performance (Munisi, Hermes & Randøy, 
2014). Studies including Allen et al., (2005, 2012) show that, legal institutions by themselves 
fail to explain problems with corporate governance. Munisi, Hermes & Randøy, (2014) opine 
that, the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms depends on both the institutional 
framework and legal enforcement. Considering the nature of PE investment and the 
characteristics of emerging economies, the interplay of the above theories discussed 
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undoubtedly would serve as a stepping stone on which the impact of PE investment in 
emerging economies can be assessed (Meyer & Nguyen ,2005). 
 
3.2 Empirical findings from previous research 
 
3.2.1 Private equity stake and recipients’ performance 
Empirical literature assessing the effects of PE on firm performance overlaps with studies that 
assess the impact of leveraged (Battistin et al., 2013). Since the highly leveraged hostile 
takeovers took over several public companies in the United in 1980s, the effects of PE 
investments have been lively debated. Considerably, PE investment has changed since the 
1980s, extending their scope from leverage buyouts that entail almost the acquisition of a 
majority stake, to minority investments as well. Lerner et al., (2009) and Kaplan & Stromberg 
(2009) commented on the non-trivial role played by minority investments. 
  
Kaplan & Stromberg, (2009) commented on the rising importance of minority investment 
types of deals and speculated that, the 2008 economic crisis will lead to a substantial growth 
of buyout related interest rates, and hence will increase minority stakes in PE investment. 
Lerner et al. (2009), sampled worldwide completed PE deals from 1984 to 2008 where 
minority investments accounted for 72.7% of transactions, and were largely predominant in 
venture capital (99.5%), growth capital (99.3%), public equity (98.9%), private placement 
(59.9%), other PE-backed acquisitions (56.8%), and almost completely missing was LBOs- 
majority stake (0.9%). According to Lerner et al. (2009), growth capital and private 
investments in public equity (i.e. value investments that were almost completely undertaken 
by means of minority stakes) accounted for 23.4% of all PE-backed transaction. Studying the 
relationship between firm performance and investment stake is therefore a necessity.  
 
Notwithstanding the widespread occurrence of minority deals, as well as their relevance in the 
activities of PE firms, the empirical evidence on their effects is still scanty (Battistin et al., 
2013). Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, none of these studies focused on emerging 
markets. Chen et al. (2014), focus on 123 minority investments in publicly held targets carried 
out from 1990 to 2006 in the US and found only weak evidence that minority investment 
increases firm profitability. Battistin et al. (2016), sampled 90 majority and 101 minority 
targets investments undertaken by PE investment in Italy between 1995 and 2004 confirmed 
that, PE investments contribute to the value generation of portfolio companies through the 
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promotion of growth more than through restructuring and control seeking measures. They 
therefore concluded that, (I) target firms experience strong growth in sales and profitability 
but there is a strong evidence that the effect is way larger in minority investments (ii) where 
PE complements but not substitute the previous ownership and also backs existing corporate 
board rather than substitute them through minority deals, minority investments clearly 
outperform majority investments in terms of profitability. Boucly et al., (2011) studying a 
large sample of PE-backed LBOs undertaken in France from 1994 to 2004, find that firms 
experience significant sales and profitability growth after the PE deals, similarly to what one 
would expect ex-ante for minority and majority targets. Therefore, whether majority and 
minority targets perform differently after the deal is still an empirical matter worth of 
investigation.  On governance measures, Boucly et al., (2011) opine that, both minimum and 
maximum investment affect board composition with majority deals having significant effect. 
It may well be that, variations in performance are mediated by important changes in the 
board. In the hindsight, the effect of majority investment on the boards doesn’t come as a 
surprise. Empirical studies on leverage buyouts, that forms the most part of majority deals 
including, Gou et al., (2011) and Acharya et al. (2012), show that PE tends to have significant 
effect on the board. Whilst the evidence about PE effect on target governance controls is not 
strikingly surprising, to Battistin (2016), minority investments perform better than majority 
investments, although understandably, majority investors actively involved in management 
and board structures. These findings in one way or the other, are in line with the prediction of 
Kaplan and Stromberg (2009): PE investments can create value at the company level without 
having full control of targets, thanks to their experience in operational engineering. 
 
3.2.2 Founder involvement in management and firm performance 
Private firms are usually owned and managed by a small, concentrated group of shareholders 
(Cumming et al., 2007). This may point to the immense role that founders can play to impact 
financial performance of PE recipient firms given the close nature of the industry. However, 
there is limited research on how the active involvement of founders in PE funding recipients’ 
management may impact performance especially in emerging markets. The analysis in 
literature concerning founder-management and firm performance can also be extended to the 
PE industry as done by Randøy et al. (2013), where the authors used Microfinance 
institutions.  Randøy et al. (2013), assessing the impact of entrepreneur-CEOs in 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) using a sample size of 295 suggest that entrepreneur-
managed MFIs are associated with greater financial sustainability and lower cost. The finding 
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by Randøy & Goel (2003) is in line with a study conducted by Adam et al (2009) to 
understand the relationship between founder-CEOs and firm performance. Fahlenbrach 
(2009), sampling 2,327 unique firms and 3,633 CEOs in the US finds that founder-CEO firms 
have higher firm value and stock performance than non-founder-CEO firms. Daily & Dalton 
(1992), show no significant different between founder-managed firms and professionally 
managed firms. They however note that “it may be that the alleged relationship between 
founder-managed and professionally managed firms and corporate performance is more 
complex than has been implied” (Daily & Dalton, 1992 p 31). Wruck, (2008) emphasises that 
co-ownership by top management helps increase the profitability and overall financial 
performance of firms. This is because from the agency cost and corporate governance 
perspectives, the interest of investors, management and/or founder will be aligned to promote 
superior performance. 
 
Literature including Schulze et al., 2002; Morck & Yeung 2003; Howorth et al., 2004 and 
Scholes et al., 2007 recognize that private firms’ ownership and control structures can 
introduce agency problems. Private ownership and owner management may limit external 
control causing owners to adopt behaviours that are not economically motivating (Batistine et 
al., 2016). Owner management is driven by personal preferences or taste of owners which in 
the end harm themselves as well as those around them (Schulze et al. 2001).  Schulze et al., 
(2002) cites such harmful actions of owner-management as; the use of owner-manager 
position to assist friends and families or to refuse change in business model because this 
would threaten the status quo (Batistine et al., 2016). According to Dawson, (2011), these 
problems are characterised with private firms, where tendency to nepotism and willingness of 
owner to retain ownership control at all costs is high.   
 
To the further side of the effect, PE investment enhance entrepreneurship and promote 
strategic innovation (Markides 1997; Wright et al., 2001) in firms where such opportunities 
cannot be achieved under current ownership (Britiatine, 2016). According to Randøy & Goel 
(2003), founder-led firms are associated with low agency cost which may be exploited for 
strategic purposes. The low agency cost as shown in literature and the overall motivation that 
entrepreneurs/founders bring on board may account for the significant association found 
between founder involvement in management and firm performance. However, the study of 
how founder involvement impact performance in the PE industry remains scanty if there is 
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any at all to the best of our knowledge. The extension of such analysis to the PE industry may 
however be of utmost importance given its closed nature. 
 
3.2.3 Private Equity, Corporate governance and performance 
In assessing corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of recipient firms we 
focus much attention on board size. This is because board size will naturally be in conformity 
with other board structure characteristics such as proportion outside directors, number of 
committees etc. Also, given the close nature of the PE industry, the study of the association 
between board size as an attribute of board structure and recipients’ performance may be in 
the right direction. 
 
Many are the research works on how the structure and effectiveness of board of directors 
affect performance of firms. However, as noted by Yermack (1996), empirical works on 
board structure usually overlook board size effect on performance but rather concentrate on 
proportion of outside directors, stock ownership by directors and chief executive’s influence. 
This motivated Yermack study on the relationship between board size and performance using 
a panel data set of 452 large public corporations in the U. S showing a negative relationship 
between board size and firm value. His result is in line with other recommendations from 
Lipton &Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) who advocate a limit on board size. The reason 
usually cited for the negative relationship is that small groups make better and effective 
decisions that large because of increased complexities in communication and coordination. 
Eisenberg et al. (1996), conducted similar research using a sample of 900 small Finnish firms 
to assess the extent to which the negative relationship between board size and performance 
holds for small firms. As noted by the researchers this was necessary as different factors may 
account for the board size and structure in the two class of firms. Most importantly the agency 
problem affecting board size and structure may not be prevalent in smaller firms. However, 
their findings were consistent with earlier research works still indicating a negative 
relationship between board size and performance in smaller firms. 
 
In the PE industry, we extent the analysis of Eisenberg et al. (1996) to it on the premise that 
the recipient firms tend to be small. According to the authors, the negative association 
between board-size and performance can exist although smaller firms tends to have less 
separation of ownership and control than in large firms. This is usually the case in most 
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recipient firms as the founder tends to the CEO or actively involved in the running of the 
business.  
Communication and coordination problems emanating from agency problems may be present 
in PE firms if fund managers or founders choose suboptimal board structures. Most 
importantly large board size goes in accordance with large proportion of outside directors. 
Research have shown that outside directors tend to favour the interest of shareholders 
affecting the overall performance of firms (Hickman, 1992; Yermack, 1996). A plausible 
explanation can be the one given by Eisenberg et al (1998) suggesting owners choose boards 
that will meet their preferences. That is there the tendency for fund managers to choose 
members to join the board since they will meet their preferences. 
 
“Private equity firms combine significant and concentrated share ownership with effective 
board oversight, thereby reuniting the corporate risk-bearing and governance functions that 
are separated when companies go public. And the results of such changes in ownership and 
governance have been impressive” (Wruck, 2008, p 12). The author seems to suggest that PE 
firms ensure good corporate governance mechanism for the ultimate performance of firms. 
Theoretically, it is argued that PE can improve the operations of supported firms by reducing 
agency costs (Jensen 1986, 1989). Jayhun (2016) opines that PE adjusts managers’ incentives 
to meet the interests of executives such that, improvements in the operating performance of 
firms benefits both parties. General partners close monitoring of the firms in which they have 
invested by actively joining the board of directors and taking part in proceedings reduce 
agency cost (Kaplan & Stömberg, 2003). 
 
Indeed, numerous research works have not only focused the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanism and firm performance using PE firms over the years but also on 
factors impacting the governance of PE firms. Cumming et al. (2008) investigating 
governance using investments of venture capitalists in 3848 portfolio firms in 39 countries 
from North and South America, Europe and Asia from the years 1971 to 2003 found that 
cross-country differences in legality have a significant impact on the governance structure of 
venture capital investments. The control rights in PE firms by means of board representation 
tends to be natural related to legality (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003).  Again, returns have 
shown to be greater in countries with stronger legal conditions (La Porta et al., 1998; 
Cumming and Walz, 2004). This emphasises the importance of the legal environment as a 
catalyst for external corporate governance mechanisms (Cumming et al., 2008). Cumming et 
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al. (2006) conducting an extensive analysis on 468 PE investments from 12 Australasian 
countries provided a consistent evidence that PE companies are more likely to achieve IPOs 
in countries with a superior environment. 
 
3.3 Research Hypotheses 
We present our research hypotheses in this subsection 
 
3.3.1 Private equity stake and firm performance 
Considering the evidence discussed in the empirical finding of minority and majority stake in 
PE investment and owner-management, we align these two categories of investment stake 
with the agency theory, corporate governance, and institutional theories to determine how the 
effect of PE on firms varies with regards to minority and majority stakes. Battistin et al., 
(2016) propose that, (i) In majority investment, the reduction of agency cost is associated with 
an ‘‘institutional’’ superiority of PE investors as owners and they radically adjust firm’s 
strategic direction and also substitute the existing owners. (ii) In minority investments, the 
investors resources complement existing owners and in this case, reduction of agency costs 
may manifest through investors acting as active minority shareholders, monitoring controlling 
shareholders’ behaviour and their commitment to value creation.  They add that, there is 
difficulty in predicting the net effect of the substitution of incumbent owners with majority 
investment representatives on entrepreneurship and strategic resources because as the investor 
brings in additional resources, those delivered by existing owners are less valued and lost 
within a short period. Achleitner et al., (2008) stated that, investors’ expertise is likely to be in 
areas such as financial engineering, management information systems, and strategy 
development. In minority investment, drawing on institutional theories, these investors 
expertise are augmented by the existing owner’s knowledge regarding the host country’s 
environment and possibly relevant industry and firm-related matter (Batistin et al., 2013).  
 
Moreover, through majority investment, investors provide intensive oversight of their 
recipient firms operating in countries with weak institutions (Holderness, 2003).  This is done 
through both board participation, informal visits and involvement in key strategic decisions in 
countries where institutional and regulatory framework is generally inefficient (Holderness, 
2003; Maury & Pajuste 2005). Advocates note that majority stake provides superior form of 
governance, while opponents depict them as an illusion to transfer value from entrepreneurs 
to corporate raiders at the expense of the long- term growth and profitability of recipient firms 
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(Battistin et al., 2013). We therefore expect the differential effects of minority and majority 
stake to be stronger in emerging economies where institutional effects play critical role in 
business success. Though Common-law countries are ascribed with strongest legal protection 
of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000), in Ghana, relatively, corporate governance 
and minority’s interest protection is strong in listed firms but weak in unlisted firms leading to 
increase in agency cost and increasing dispute resolution at commercial courts (Agyemang & 
Castellini, 2015).  On the other hand, the maximum stake a private investor could invest is 
49.9% of the market value of the firm. Thus, the threshold of 50% majority is not applicable 
and we ascribe majority and minority status based on how high or low the shares acquired by 
PE investors are. These empirical findings, coupled with the national characteristics of Ghana, 
lead us to formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between private equity investment and performance of the 
recipient firms. 
 
3.3.2 Private equity, founder involvement in management and recipients’ performance 
We now investigate how the involvement of founders/entrepreneurs in the management of PE 
firms can impact recipients’ performance. Previous research works on the involvement of 
founders/entrepreneurs and founding family in management show that such firms are 
associated with superior performance (e.g., Randøy & Goel, 2003; Adams et al., 2009; 
Fahlenbrach, 2009). We believe such analysis in literature concerning founder-management 
and firm performance can also be extended to the PE industry. The positive impact of 
founders on firms as previous literature suggests may be explained from the social and human 
capital that founders might have built over time. This is because an entrepreneur starts a 
business by building networks and accumulating resources which are key to the survival of 
the business. The entrepreneur/ founder also carries the overall direction and innovation 
surrounding the business. Thus, when PE investors come on board their human and social 
capital augment that of founders and in a whole, enhance performance of the firms. 
 
Randøy & Goel (2003), suggest that founder-led firms are associated with low agency cost 
which may be exploited for strategic purposes. According to Cumming et al (2007), private 
firms are usually owned and managed by a small, concentrated group of shareholders and 
could have lower pre-investment agency costs. Theoretically, it is also argued that PE can 
improve the operations of supported firms by reducing agency costs (Jensen 1986; 1989). 
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Thus, from agency perspective, the small concentrated nature of shareholding with active 
close monitoring help reduce agency cost to increase the performance of recipients. On the 
other hand, the institutional framework existing in a country may serve as hindrance to 
benefits discussed. Cognitive element of institutions including subconsciously accepted rules 
and customs as defined by Bruton et al., (2004) can harm firm performance. In countries like 
Ghana where favouritism and nepotism is an acceptable norm there is the tendency for private 
ownership and owner management to limit external control causing owners to adopt 
behaviours that are not economically motivating (Batistine et al., 2016). The founder may 
favour people for example appointing directors onto the board which can be detrimental to 
firm’s performance leading to aggravation of the agency problem.  
 
However, we argue that the overall motivation and willingness to succeed attitude of 
founders/entrepreneurs should supersede any desire to engage in nepotism or favouritism 
(Randøy et al., 2013). Hence, we hypothesize: 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between founder management and performance of 
recipient firms. 
 
3.3.3 Private equity, board size and recipients’ performance 
The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms depends on both the institutional 
framework and their enforcement (Munisi, Hermes & Randøy, 2014; Luio, Chao   & Yang, 
2016). This may be in the right direction as the enforcement of laws depends on how the 
institutions in a country functions.  Moreover, fund managers close monitoring of the firms in 
which they have invested by actively joining the board of directors and taking part in 
proceedings reduces agency cost (Kaplan and Stömberg, 2003).  Munisi & Randøy (2013), 
find that the corporate governance index score has a positive and significant association with 
the companies’ accounting performance (ROA). Kajola (2008) argues that firms should 
ensure a limit on their board size.  PE backed firms typically have relatively few board of 
directors (usually five to eight) (Wruck, 2008). Therefore, the PE corporate governance model 
implies small boards for superior performance. In developing our next hypothesis, we follow 
Yermack, (1996, p 189) argument that “firm value depends on the quality of monitoring and 
decision-making by the board of directors, and that the board’s size represents an important 
determinant of its performance”. Ribiero et al. (2008), opine that PE as a model was started 
from U.S to most emerging markets and invariable the structures underlying its success will 
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be different from these emerging markets. Their argument may be correct considering the lack 
of transparency and difficulty in doing business in these countries. Given the different 
institutional context in both developed and emerging countries, the dilemma now is whether 
the findings of negative association between board size and performance (see Lipton &Lorsch 
1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998) will still be present in emerging 
countries and most importantly Ghana, the country of analysis. Thus, we formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3: There is a negative relationship between the board size of private equity recipient firms 
and financial performance. 
 
3.4 Conceptual framework 
Based on agency, transaction cost, institutional and corporate governance theories, as well as 
the empirical findings discussed above, we present the conceptual framework for the study. 
The framework is based on the relationships established by the research hypotheses (H1, H2 
and H3 in the section. The framework is shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework 
 
 
                                                 Private equity  
                                                        stake 
 
 
     Founder                                              + H1                            
    Involvement in                                                                      Board size 
     management                                                              
                                      +H2         Financial              - H3                          
                                                     Performance                          
 
 
Source: Authors’ own construct 
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3.5 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we presented the main theories which the study is based on. We also reviewed 
and commented on previous empirical finding on the research topic. Finally, we ended with 
the hypotheses for the study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA 
4.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, we describe the data for the research as well as the sampling and data 
collection procedures. Again, we discuss the validity and representativeness of the data. 
 
4.1 Data source and sample description 
Data may be obtained from two main sources; primary and secondary sources. “Primary data 
refers to information obtained first-hand by the researcher on variables of interest for the 
specific purpose of the study whereas information gathered from sources that already exist is 
a secondary data” (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013, p 113). We employ both primary data and 
secondary data sources for this cross-sectional analysis on the impact of PE funding on 
financial performance of recipient firms. Despite primary data sources being our focus to 
obtain real field data, secondary sources also played eminent role 
 
Because of the relatively small number of active PE fund managers in Ghana and the 
unknown status of some of investment advisors as at the time of the study, purposive 
sampling technique was used in this study.  According to Agyemang & Castellini (2015), at 
the beginning of 2013, 91 investment advisors had been licensed by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Ghana but their operational status as at 2015 was unknown mainly 
because the Securities Industries Law, 1993 (PNDCL 333) does not capture PE or venture 
capital investments Therefore, only the list of firms provided by the Ghana’s Venture Capital 
Trust Fund was included in the survey to avoid the tendency of using false information from 
“legally unrecognised PE fund managers. The study surveyed the entire population of 5 fund 
managers and 28 investee firms recognised by the VCTF shown in below (Table 4.1) with a 
100% response rate. However, cleaning of the data for missing information, outliers and 
inconsistencies resulted in 23 recipient firms. Detailed descriptive statistics and discussion of 
the impact of PE on these firms are presented in chapter 6. 
 
Thompson (1999) posits that, sampling technique in qualitative or mixed study is guided by 
the need to select subjects and data possible to produce robust, rich and unfathomable levels 
of appreciation but not strictly by the need to generalise about something. Bleijenbergh, 2010; 
Mills et al., 2010; Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki 2010 opine that, sampling for studies using a 
case as evidence is about suitability, objective and access to adequate information rather than 
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general representativeness as in the case of pure quantitative research. This study used the 
purposive sampling technique where legally recognised firms were selected to provide rich 
evidence. To mirror the image of how PE funding has impacted firms in Ghana rather than 
conjecturing and accepting what is supposed to have taken place with regards to theories on 
the relationship between firms’ performance and PE investment in emerging markets, this 
technique was used. The survey covered financial performance of the recipient firms as at the 
year 2015 and the corporate governance mechanism employed by the fund managers in the 
recipient firms. Prospects of the entire PE industry and investment environment in Ghana 
were also explored. 
 
Table 4.1 List of Private equity fund managers, recipient firms and industry focus 
 Fund Managers  Recipient Firms (Ltd firm) Industry Focus 
1 Gold Venture Limited 1. Caltech Venture 
2. Graphic Colour  
3. Villa Monticello  
 
1. Agro-processing 
2. Digital printing 
3. Hospitality 
 
2 Bedrock Venture Capital 
Financing Limited 
1. Allied Cocoa 
2. Elsa  
3. Scientellect 
1. Manufacturing 
2. Agro-Processing 
3. Agro-Processing 
3 Ebankese Fund Limited 1. Builders Accessories  
2. GH Housing 
3. Pentfield Schools 
4. Redrow Developments 
5. Rising Sun school 
6. Wenchi Rural Bank 
 
1. Manufacturing 
2. Real Estate 
3. Education 
4. Real Estate 
5. Education 
6. Financial Services 
4 Activity Venture Finance 
Company Ltd 
1. African University College 
of Communications 
2. EKA Processing 
3. Immanuel School 
4. J&Q 
5. Natural Scientific 
6. Vestor Oil 
1. Education 
 
2. Agro-Processing 
3. Education 
4. Manufacturing 
5. Healthcare 
6. Manufacturing 
5 Fidelity fund II Financing 1. Diagnostic Centre 
2. Emerald Properties 
3. LaGray 
4. Process & Plants GH. 
1. Healthcare 
2. Real Estate 
3. Healthcare 
4. Real Estate 
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Table 4.2 List of Firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange used as control group 
Listed Firms (Limited) Industry Focus 
1. African Champion Industries 
2. Aluworks 
3. AngloGold Ashanti 
4. Ayrton Drug Manufacturing 
5. Benso Oil Palm Plantation 
6. CAL Bank 
7. Camelot Ghana 
8. Clydestone Ghana 
9. Ecobank Ghana 
10. Enterprise Group 
11. Fan Milk 
12. Ghana Commercial Bank 
13. Ghana Oil Company 
14. Golden Star Resources 
15. Guinness Ghana Breweries 
16. HFC Bank (Ghana) 
17. Mechanical Lloyd Company 
18. Mega African Capital 
19. Pioneer Kitchenware 
20. PBC  
21. PZ Cussons Ghana 
22. Sam-Woode 
23. Societe Generale Ghana 
24. SIC Insurance Company 
25. Standard Chartered Bank Ghana 
26. Starwin Products 
27. Total Petroleum Ghana 
28. Transaction Solutions Ghana 
29. Trust Bank (The Gambia) 
30. Tullow Oil 
31. Unilever Ghana 
 
 
Manufacturing 
Manufacturing 
Mining 
Healthcare 
Agro-processing 
Financial Service 
Digital printing 
Financial service 
Financial service 
Financial service 
Manufacturing 
Financial services 
Oil & Gas 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Financing services 
Automotive 
Financial service 
Manufacturing 
Agro-processing 
Manufacturing 
Digital printing 
Financial services 
Financial services 
Financial services 
Healthcare 
Oil & Gas 
Financial Services 
Financial Services 
Oil and Gas 
Manufacturing 
 
4.2 Data collection techniques 
Two sources of data collection techniques were used to gather data: archival records and 
semi-structured interviews. This multi-approach technique was used to maximise the series of 
hard-to-get available quantitative and qualitative data from the recipient firms and fund 
managers. These techniques enhanced the data credibility, served as an edge for triangulation 
among the two methods and gave a differing view about the subject matter as well 
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compensating for their intrinsic weaknesses. Hence the strength of archival records and semi-
structured interview techniques in primary and secondary data collection were fully exploited. 
Archival records were first examined before the interview sessions to acquire historical 
backgrounds of the firms. Patton (1990, p. 245) posits that archival records’ “analysis 
provides behind-the-scenes look at the program that may not be directly observable and about 
which the interviewer might not ask appropriate questions”. Lincoln & Guba (1985, p. 27) 
buttressed this by viewing archival records as: “a stable source of information that may 
accurately reflect situations that occurred at some time in the past and that they can be 
analysed and re-analysed without undergoing changes in the interim”. Prior to the interview 
section, annual reports, publications, press releases, periodical reports by the VCTF on the 
portfolio companies were monitored to get the snap shot on the performance and governance 
mechanisms in the recipient firms. 
 
Goulding (2002), posits that, in a more realistic manner, a case study made of partly/fully 
qualitative research must use a face-to-face, semi-structured, open-ended, ethnographic, in-
depth conversational interview. The justification is that it has the possibility to produce rich 
and comprehensive accounts of a person’s experience. Face-to-face interviews were 
conducted with investment managers of the fund managers who later help reveal the identity 
of their recipient firms. The management/owners of recipient firms were further contacted for 
interviews at their respective business premises. Respondent groups were not influenced by 
each other and hence information gathered were given at their free will without duress. 
During the interview session, relevant and interesting developments cropped up that were not 
available in the archival records and others which in one way or the other contradicted the 
information in the archival data. The interviews took the structure of semi-structured 
interviews and was conducted in English and Twi (the widely spoken local language in 
Ghana). Interviews were tape-recorded and further notes were taken. In the context of this 
study, the interview session allowed the interviewees to articulate themselves in a more 
candid manner and defined the PE industry in Ghana not only as answers to the questions 
posed but from their own viewpoint. 
 
4.3 Data representativeness, validity, reliability and authenticity 
As stated in the data source section, the study surveyed the legally recognised firms in the PE 
industry in Ghana by the GVCTF which consisted of 5 fund managers and 28 recipient firms 
with a 100% response rate.  To ensure data credibility and reliability, geniuses and 
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consistency in accounting methods and figures reported in the financial statements of the 
recipient firms, only financial statements audited independently by certified auditing firms 
were used in computing their profitability measure (ROE). Furthermore, to ensure 
authenticity of financial statement used for the analysis, we gathered the financial reports 
from three sources; the recipient firms, the fund managers and the VCTF reporting on the 
same year under review for the same companies. For the control group, financial statements 
of 31 publicly traded companies were extracted from archives of Ghana stock exchange to 
access their performance in terms of profitability (Table 4.2). The computed profitability 
measure (ROE) of these listed companies were also cross-checked with archival data provided 
by Wall Street Journal 12  on these listed companies. Detailed descriptive statistics and 
discussion of the data of the recipient firms are presented in chapter 6. 
4.4 Chapter summary 
Given our research objectives and with the purposive sampling method, archival records and 
semi structured interviews were used in collecting both secondary and primary data 
respectively. We created a Storehouse of information from the given sample which we believe 
is a true representation of the population that is needed to achieve the aim of the study and 
ensure generalisability of our findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
12  https://www.wsj.com 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
METHODOLOGY 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the research methodology for our work. We provide a detailed 
discussion of the techniques and procedures that will be followed to analyse the data. Thus, 
the process we will go through to measure concepts and answer the research questions. 
5.1 Operationalisation and measurement of concepts 
The “reduction of abstract concepts to render them measurable in a tangible way is called 
operationalising the concepts” Sekaran and Bougie (2013, p. 200). Operationalisation thus 
help to make concepts measurable to test hypothesized statements and have answers to the 
research questions. The main concepts in this mixed method research include; corporate 
governance and PE financial performance. We select specific measures for the various 
concepts based on previous empirical studies. 
5.1.1 Independent and dependent variables 
The dependent variable for answering our research questions is a measure of firm profitability 
as found in literature especially we follow Bruton et al. (2010) for the first research question 
and Yermack, (1996); Eisenberg et al., 1998 for the second research question. The 
independent variable for the first research question is equity stake of investors’ in recipient 
firms. We use corporate governance variables as independent variables to help answer the 
second research question; board size and a dummy for founder involvement in management.  
5.1.2 Control variables 
In this study, we include controls in our analysis as found in literatures relating to PE research 
and corporate governance (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Bruton et al., 2010). The 
controls are firm specific in nature. They are age of the firm, size (log of total assets) and 
industry of operations. However, given our small sample size we add one control variable at a 
time. In Table 5.1 below we explain or identify the measures for the variables; dependent, 
independent and controls. The expected relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables are presented in table 5.2 
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Table 5.1: Explanation of variables 
 
Variables Explanation/Measure 
Private Equity Variables 
Private equity stake Fund managers’ equity stake in recipient firms 
Amount invested Amount invested by fund managers in recipient firms 
Private Equity Identity of the five fund managers 
Origin of funds 
A dummy variable with value of (1) if funding is sourced 
locally and value of (0) if funding is a combination of 
both local and foreign sources 
Performance Variables 
Growth rate Annual percentage change in sales (revenue) 
ROE  
Return on Equity (Net profit as percentage of total 
shareholders’ equity) 
Corporate governance variables 
Founder management 
A dummy variable with value of (1) if the entrepreneur is 
part of management and value of (0) if the entrepreneur is 
not part of management 
Private equity on board 
Number of private equity investors representation on 
recipients’ board. 
Board size Number of directors on the recipients’ boards 
Firm specific variables 
Size Log of total assets 
Age Number of years the firm has been in operation 
Industry 
A dummy variable with value of (1) if the firm operates 
in the financial services industry and value of (0) for 
otherwise 
Number of employees Recipient firms total number of employees as at 2015  
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Table 5.2: Expected relationship between dependent and independent variables 
 Expected 
Dependent variable (ROE) Independent variable                                                    
Private Equity variable 
Private equity stake                                                                      
 
                        + 
Corporate governance variables 
Founder involvement in management                                           
Board size                                                                                       
 
 
                        + 
                         - 
 
5.2 Data analysis techniques 
To access the impact of PE funding on recipients we adopted a mixed methodology. A 
concurrent mixed method procedure is used. This strategy characterised an attempt to cross 
validate and confirm findings within a single research work using two different methods 
(Creswell, 2003). We therefore apply both quantitative and qualitative techniques in analysing 
our data. Given the limited sample size, we believe the integration of both methods will help 
enrich and triangulate our findings and interpretations. The data analysis begins with a 
descriptive statistic to help familiarise ourselves with the dataset and various variables 
relating to the recipient firms. Descriptive statistics is said to be a useful way of summarising 
a dataset and the simplest means of statistical analysis (Fisher & Marshall, 2009). 
 
The first stage of the analysis is focused on answering the first research question. To assess 
the impact of PE on recipient firms, we explore t-test, bivariate correlation and regression 
models. To assess if there is significant difference between PE firms’ performance and that of 
listed firms, we perform an independent t-test. This involves comparing the means of the 
performance variables and for such analysis sample t-test is appropriate (Sekaran & Bougie, 
2013). The bivariate correlation analysis is used to study the association between PE variables 
and performance variable. The focus here is to measure the extent of the association which 
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will argument the univariate analysis. We also conduct a linear regression test where our 
dependent variable is ROE with PE stake as the only independent variable. The limited 
sample size places restrictions on our ability to include more explanatory variables. We 
control for firms’ specific effects one at a time. We also present summary of themes from the 
interviews related to PE performance. The use of bivariate correlation and linear regression 
are the quantitative techniques adopted to answer the second research question. In the 
regression analysis, ROE is the dependent variable with board size and a dummy variable for 
founder involvement as the independent variables. We also add controls for firms’ specific 
effects. The transcribing of recorded interviews and summarizing themes will also offer 
further explanations to the findings from the quantitative data analysis techniques. 
5.3 Regression equations 
In this section, we present the equations for our regression analysis. We conduct the 
regression analysis with nine regression equations controlling for firm specific effects. 
 
ROEi = β0 + β1PE_stakei + β2Sizei + εi…………………………………………..(1) 
ROEi = β0 + β1PE_stakei + β2Industryi +εi……………………………………..(2) 
ROEi = β0 + β1PE_stakei + β2Agei + εi…………………………………………..(3) 
ROEi = β0 + β1DM_Founder_Mgti + β2Sizei + εi…………………………..(4) 
ROEi = β0 + β1DM_Founder_Mgti + β2Industryi + εi…………………….(5) 
ROEi = β0 + β1DM_Founder_Mgti + β2Agei + εi…………………………...(6) 
ROEi = β0 + β1Board sizei + β2Sizei + εi…………………………………………(7) 
ROEi = β0 + β1Board sizei + β2Industryi + εi…………………………………..(8) 
ROEi = β0 + β1Board sizei + β2Agei + εi…………………………………………(9) 
 
Where; 
ROE = Return on equity, PE_stake =Private equity investors’ stake in recipient firms and 
DM_Founder_mgt = Founder involvement in management 
5.4 Test of assumptions 
This section focuses on testing the assumptions underlying OLS regression. These include; 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
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5.4.1 Multicollinearity 
There is exist the problem of multicollinearity if the independent variables in a model are 
highly or perfectly correlated. Multicollinearity issue arises because two or more independent 
variables contain the same information which will affect the predictive ability of the model 
(Sarstedt & Mooi, 2014).  We test for this by generating a correlation matrix and Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) for the independent variables. The correlation matrix for the three 
equations is shown in table 5.3 while the VIF for the independent variable are presented in 
appendix i.  
 
Table 5.3 Correlation matrix 
Hair et al (2010), opines that there is the problem of multicollinearity when the correlation 
value is greater than 0.9. From the table, the highest value is the correlation between board 
size and industry with a corresponding value of 0.5447. Therefore, since none of the 
correlation values is above 0.9 we conclude that there is the absence of the problem of 
multicollinearity. Also, turning to the VIF values, it shows multicollinearity is not a problem. 
By this we follow the suggesting given by (Sarstedt & Mooi, 2014) that a tolerance of below 
0.10 indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem. 
5.4.2 Test for heteroscedasticity 
When errors of a linear model have, unequal spread or variance it results in the problem of 
heteroscedasticity which can lead to biased estimates if not corrected (Gujarat, 2003). To test 
for this, we use Breusch-Pagan test in Stata with a null hypothesis of a constant variance. The 
results are presented in table 5.4 below where the p-value in bold indicates the presence of 
         Age     0.4727  -0.1588   0.3954  -0.0154   0.2206   1.0000
    Industry    -0.1087   0.5447  -0.2919   0.1492   1.0000
        Size    -0.4239   0.2513  -0.1708   1.0000
D_Founder_~t     0.4118  -0.4183   1.0000
  Board_size    -0.3647   1.0000
    PE_stake     1.0000
                                                                    
               PE_stake Board_~e D_Foun~t     Size Industry      Age
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heteroscedasticity. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis for model ii and adopt a robust 
standard error approach to correct for the problem as found in literature (Sarstedt & Mooi, 
2014). 
 
 
Table 5.4: Results for Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity 
 
5.4.3 Test for autocorrelation 
The problem of autocorrelation exists in a linear regression model when the errors are 
dependent of each other. That is the errors tend to be correlated for any two observations 
(Sarstedt & Mooi, 2014). This problem also leads to inefficient estimates. We test for this by 
using Durbin-Watson test with a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The results are 
presented in Table 5.5. As before the p-values in bold indicate the presence of autocorrelation. 
Hence, we perform the analysis by using robust standard errors (Sarstedt & Mooi, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression equations Χ2 p-value 
1 0.47 0.4941 
2 0.72 0.3958 
3 0.00 0.9766 
4 2.52 0.1124 
5 2.87 0.0900 
6 4.55 0.0328 
7 2.10 0.1469 
8 1.26 0.2625 
9 0.68 0.4090 
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Table 5.5 Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5 Robustness check 
Using growth rate as dependent variable in first research question we perform further analysis 
on how PE impact financial performance of recipient firms. We also check the robustness of 
our board size effect results by extending the analysis to include listed firms. By so doing we 
seek to get an overall view in Ghana considering its legal status and institutional framework. 
5.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we explained the operationalisation of concepts and the techniques for 
analysing the data. We employ a mixed methodology approach where qualitative and 
quantitate techniques is to be used. By quantitative methods, we employ t-test, bivariate 
correlation and OLS regression techniques. 
 
 
 
Regression equations Durbin-Watson d-statistic 
1 0.719863 
2 0.6694711 
3 0.9272898 
4 0.6220839 
5 0.4997218 
6 0.7723961 
7 0.5198684 
8 0.5246112 
9 0.7412004 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
6.0 Introduction 
The results of the statistical models used in analysing the data are presented here which will 
help in answering the research questions.  
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
This section presents summary characteristics of both PE recipient firms and listed firms in 
the dataset. Table 6.1 report the descriptive statistics of the dependent and the independent 
variables of the study. 
 
Regarding the financial variables from the dataset, 7 out of the 23 PE recipient firms and 11 
out of 31 listed firms achieved negative return on equity. On average the ROE of the PE 
recipient firms is 12% with the maximum 74% and minimum -80%. The story of negative 
returns was not evitable for the listed firms as the maximum, minimum, and average returns 
on equity are 112%, -104% and 5% respectively. Also, on average, the return on asset for 
both PE backed firms and listed companies were -16% and 6% respectively with the later 
having maximum of 94% and minimum of -28%, and maximum of 25% and -400% minimum 
for the former. Financial performance from the dataset proves that PE investors earn almost 
twice as the return equity investor earn in on the stock market. A t-test in chapter five will 
explains how significant the difference is.  
 
In terms of age of the firms, on average, a PE firm is about 13 years old while its listed 
counterpart is about 38 years old. The maximum and minimum age of both PE firms and 
listed firms are; 31 years and 6 years, and 91 years and 7 years respectively. Also, the longest 
PE fund investment was 8 years with a minimum of 1 year and average of 4.6 years. The 
average value of assets held by PE firms in the dataset is US$ 2,279,770 with US$30,174 and 
US$9,615,164 been the least and highest value of assets respectively. Listed firms have an 
average of US$ 936,138,045 and the minimum and maximum asset base of US$589,110.46 
and US$11,347,800,000 respectively.  
 
The vast difference in the ages and asset base of PE firms and listed firms points to the fact 
that, most of the PE firms are at their growth stages. This is manifested in the PE growth rate 
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of 18% which is 6% higher than the growth rate of listed firms. Per the interview with the 
fund managers, it was revealed that, around 90% of exited deals yielded three folds of the of 
the amount invested.  Considering the growth cycle of firms and the; age, asset, investment 
years and growth rate in the PE firms in the dataset, the negative and low returns of some PE 
firms may not imply poor performance but probably future returns for the current and 
immediate past investments may manifest in higher positive returns and act as turnaround for 
the least performing firms.  
 
Whilst listed firms operate in ten different industries, the five PE fund managers in the dataset 
manage firms in 8 different industries with each firm employing an average of 61 employees, 
with 250 and 3 employees as maximum and minimum number of employees respectively. On 
the source of PE funding, local funds constitute majority (75%) of the total funds managed by 
the 5 general partners in the dataset and the combination of both local and foreign sources 
constituted the minority (25%). None of the PE investments was solely backed by foreign 
funds.  
 
Turning to the share of ownership, in Ghana, legally, PE investors cannot own above 49% of 
the recipient firm. In the dataset, PE investors on average take ownership stake of 28%, 
minimum stake of 5% and maximum stake of 45%. The averages for the founder management 
dummy gives an indication that most founders of the PE backed firms play crucial role in the 
management processes since the ownership stake restriction invariably makes all investments 
minority. In the dataset, 65% of the sample firms have their founders being engaged in the 
management of the firms and 35% being the vice versa. The board size of the PE firms ranges 
between a maximum of 8 and a minimum of 3 members with an average of 5 while board size 
of listed firms ranges between a maximum of 11 and a minimum of 5 members with an 
average of 8. In addition to the attractiveness of Ghana highlighted in the previous section, 
overall, the variables in the dataset suggests that the PE industry in Ghana is young, small, 
very attractive and to an extent mimics the typical characteristics of the ignition stages of PE 
in most emerging markets. From the PE players’ perspective, we consider the Ghanaian 
economy as a market with many investment opportunities. 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for private equity recipient firms 
Variables Obs. Std. Dev. Mean Minimum Maximum 
Financial performance variables 
 
ROE 23 0.12 0.32 -0.8 0.74 
      
Growth rate 
 
23 0.18 0.30 -0.55 0.68 
Corporate governance variables 
 
Board_size 
 
23 5.26 1.10 3 8 
DM_founder_mgt 
 
23 0.65 0.49 0 1 
Private equity variables 
 
PE_stake 
 
23 0.28 0.11 0.05 0.45 
DM_Origin_funds 
 
23 0.26 0.49 0 1 
Recipients specific controls 
 
Age 
 
23 13.17 5.76 6 31 
DM_Industry 
 
23 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Size 
 
23 2,279,770.00 2,436,803.00 30,174.10 9,615,164.00 
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Table 6.2: Listed firms’ summary characteristics 
Variables Obs. Std. Dev. Mean Minimum Maximum 
Financial performance variables 
 
ROE 30 0.05 0.42 -1.04 1.12 
      
Growth rate 
 
30 0.11 0.33 -0.72 0.78 
Corporate governance variables 
 
Board_size 
 
30 8.3 1.73 5 11 
Listed firms’ specific controls 
 
Age 
 
30 38.37 19.84 7 91 
DM_Industry 
 
30 0.40 0.50 0 1 
Size 
 
30 936,138,044.79 1,912,897,199.54 589,110.46 11,347,800,000.00 
 
 
6.2 Private equity and recipient firms’ performance 
First, we access the performance of PE firms by univariate t-test analysis and augment it with 
a regression analysis. 
6.2.1 Results of t-test 
The aim of the t-test is to compare the means of the two independent groups in this research. 
By comparing both listed and PE firms we seek to find out if there is a significant difference 
between their performance and an independent t-test allows that. The null hypothesis for this 
test is that there is no significant difference between the performance of the samples. 
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Table 6.3: Results of t-test  
               Means 
 
  
Variables 
 
Listed firms PE recipient firms t-statistic p-value 
ROE 
 
0.04695 0.1216 0.7036 0.4849 
ROA 
 
0.05761 -0.1622 -1.3271 0.1904 
Growth rate 
 
0.1116 0.1812 0.7885 0.4340 
                                    * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01   
 
From the above table, we find no significant difference between the performance of PE 
funded firms and listed firms. Considering the growth cycle of firms and response of the 
interview, PE fund managers were confident in high future returns for the current and 
immediate past investments. We therefore presume that, the lack of significant difference 
between the performance of PE funded firms and listed firms may change considerably in the 
next few years. 
 
Table 6.4: Results of correlation test between ROE, private equity stake and growth rate 
We follow the rule of thumb below in the interpretation of the correlation analysis; below 
0.30 indicates a weak relationship, between 0.30 and 0.49 shows a moderate relationship and 
above 0.49 indicates a strong relationship between the studies variables (Sarstedt & Mooi, 
2014; Cohen, 1988). 
 
Variable ROE PE_stake GR_2015 
ROE 
PE_stake 
GR_2015 
1.0000 
0.4456 
0.2622 
 
1.0000 
0.3937 
 
 
1.0000 
                                                * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
The results from the table above shows no strong statistically significant correlation between 
the variables. We however, observe a positive moderate association between PE stake and 
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ROE. PE stake also has a positive moderate association with growth rate. These associations, 
in line with our expectations was not overwhelming. Though the fund managers admitted 
during the interview sessions that they play imperative roles in financing, operations, 
strategies and governance activities of recipient firms, the legal restriction on the private 
ownership stake (maximum of 49%) in the country do limits such influences to a certain 
extent. Therefore, to draw a conclusion on a solid relationship, we use regression analysis in 
Table 6.5 in the next section to help answer the extent of association between the PE stake 
and ROE. 
6.2.2 Results of regression analysis 
Table 6.5:  Results for the effect of private equity stake on financial performance of 
private equity recipients 
 ROE ROE ROE ROE 
PE_stake 
 
Size 
 
Industry 
 
Age 
 
_cons 
 
R2 
F-statistic 
N 
0.240  
(2.16)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.469   
(2.72)***    
0.18     
4.65**   
23                                                                                       
0.207  
(1.69)  
-0.026   
(0.68) 
   
 
 
 
0.770     
(1.61)   
0.20  
2.49  
23
0.233 
(2.15)**    
 
 
-0.439 
(1.47) 
 
 
0.478  
(2.84)***  
0.26  
3.54**     
23
0.185   
(1.45)    
 
 
 
 
0.161 
(0.90) 
0.013   
(0.02)  
0.21   
2.71*     
23                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                           * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Regressing ROE on PE stake without any controls, PE stake has significant influence on 
performance at 95% confidence level. Controlling for size, industry and age separately, we 
again continue with another regression of ROE on private equity stake. However, PE stake 
has significant effect on performance only when we controlled for industry. Both size and 
industry have shown negative relationships but have no significant influence on the 
relationship between PE stake and ROE. Age shows a positive relationship with performance 
but also not significant. Notwithstanding the relatively small sample size of the study, this 
result confirms the first hypothesis of the study of the positive relationship between PE 
investment stake in the recipient firms and their financial performance. We also observe that, 
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the relationship between PE stake and ROE in the bivariate analysis is consistent with the 
regression analysis. Cross verification of the results with interviews conducted with both the 
fund managers and recipient firms further validates the results in the regression analysis. 
“Private equity investors undoubtedly have enhanced our performance in various respect, and 
with our arching need in seeking repairs to our over indebted balance sheet, we would love to 
give more stake to them but the legal clause of 49% maximum is a limitation” an entrepreneur 
confirmed13. This attests to the significant influence that PE stake has on performance of 
recipient firms which almost 90% of the respondents from the recipient firms agreed during 
the interview session.  
6.3 Corporate governance and overall performance of private equity recipient firms 
In analysing how corporate governance affect performance of PE recipient firms we 
performance a bivariate correlation test and regression analysis. As noted earlier the small 
sample size limit our ability to add all the control variables at a time. We therefore regress 
each control variable one at a time. We first present the results of the correlation test followed 
by the regression analysis. 
6.3.1 Results of correlation test 
Table 6.6: Results of correlation test between ROE and Board size/Founder_Mgt 
Variable ROE DM_founder_mgt Board size 
ROE 
DM_founder_mgt 
Board size 
1.0000 
0.5136*** 
-0.6408*** 
 
1.0000 
-0.4070 
 
 
1.0000 
                                                 * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
From Table 6.6 above we observe a significant high association between ROE and the 
corporate governance variables. The involvement of a founders in management has a strong 
positive association with ROE which is significant at 99%. Board size also has a strong 
negative association with performance which indicates that an increase in one will lead to a 
decrease in the order. But the most important question is the direction of causation, which is a 
very critical question that correlation analysis cannot answer. We will therefore turn to the 
regression analysis to help answer that. Board size also has negative moderate association 
                                                        
13 All quotes used are transcribed recordings from our interviews conducted with fund managers and 
recipients 
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with the involvement of founder in management variable. This is to be expected as firms with 
huge board sizes invariably tend to be bigger ones and the founder or entrepreneur may no 
longer be part in running the affairs of the company. 
The results of the bivariate analysis are largely to our expectations but it will be premature to 
draw conclusions based on only associations. We will therefore focus on the next section 
about regression analysis. 
 
Table 6.7: Regression result for board size effect on recipients’ performance 
 ROE ROE ROE ROE 
Board size 
 
Size 
 
Industry 
 
Age 
 
_cons 
 
R2 
F-statistic 
N 
-1.014     
(3.89)***       
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.784  
(4.14)***       
0.42       
15.10***                  
  23        
-0.960    
(3.60)***    
-0291 
(0.98)                    
                       
         
 
 
2.092  
(3.92)***      
0.45 
8.02***                                               
  23                          
-1.014        
(3.36)***     
 
 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
 
 
1.784       
(3.62)***   
0.42                   
7.19***
23              
-0.949 
(3.74)***   
 
 
 
 
0.212   
(1.66)        
1.150  
(2.04)  
0.49   
9.56***                                                                                                            
23 
                                                * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 6.8: Result for the effect of founder involvement on recipients’ performance 
 ROE ROE ROE ROE 
Founder_mgt 
 
Size 
 
Industry 
 
Age 
 
_cons 
 
R2 
F-statistic 
N 
0.340 
(2.74)**                
                                        
  
                    
 
 
 
-0.100 
(1.00)                    
0.26   
7.52**                    
  23                                          
               
0.317     
(2.53)**    
-0.368  
(1.12)         
 
 
 
 
0.415   
(0.88)        
0.31       
4.43**      
23                                                                                     
0.308         
(2.36)**  
 
 
-0.256   
(0.84)    
 
 
0.068      
(0.63)        
0.29          
4.06**     
23
0.292 
(2.06)* 
 
 
 
 
0.122   
(0.72)  
-0.374 
(0.95) 
0.28 
3.94**    
23
                                                   * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
From the two tables, above, four distinct types of regression were performed for each 
independent variable. This as noted earlier, is largely based on the limited sample size at our 
disposal. Firstly, we regress ROE on both independent variables without any controls We 
continue with a regression of ROE on the two independent variables separately while 
controlling for size, industry and age in each case.  
 
The results above show that board size has significant influence on performance at 99% 
confidence level respectively in all the regression analyses performed. Founder involvement 
in management on the other hand is significant at 95% confidence level in all the analyses 
except when controlling for age for which it becomes significant at 90% confidence level. 
Board size has a negative relationship with performance while founder involvement has a 
positive relationship with performance. These results to some extent provide support for both 
H2 and H3. Although our sample size is small for any strong conclusion, we believe it is 
consistent with the bivariate analysis as well our interviews with fund managers. Almost all 
the fund managers indicated the immense role attitude of entrepreneur or promoter has on the 
recipients’ performance. Thus, where the attitude of the founder is questionable the fund 
managers must take drastic measures to salvage the situation. “…We found one instance 
where the promoter who was also the chief executive had proven beyond reasonable doubt 
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that he is not the person to take the firm to level that we anticipated so we asked him to step 
down or stop committing funds to the investment” noted one fund manager. One plausible 
explanation for the positive relationship between performance and founder involvement is the 
overall motivation that entrepreneurs bring on board bearing in mind that their returns at the 
end of the day is linked with the survival and performance of their firm in the long run. The 
negative relationship between board size and performance may also be because of the 
complexities in large numbers. Also, small board invariably will reduce coordination cost, 
increase the speed at which decisions are made. 
 
Concerning the control variables, size and industry show negative relationships with ROE for 
both independent variables. Age on the other hand shows positive relationship with ROE 
when ROE was regressed on both board size and founder involvement in management. Yet 
none of these control variables show any significant results. 
6.4 Results for robustness check 
As indicated in section 5.5 we check for robustness of our results to research questions one 
and two. For question one, we regress growth rate on PE since some studies have shown that 
PE is associated with increase in growth rates (e.g., Boucly et al.; Battistin et al. 2016). The 
results are shown in the table presented in appendix ii (a). 
 
We find significant positive relationship between growth rate and PE stake. The confidence 
levels are 95% without controls as well as when controlling for industry of operations. These 
are in line with our earlier results when ROE was used as the dependent variable. However, 
the positive relationship between growth rate and PE stake is at a confidence level of 90% 
when controlling for size. The result is also consistent with the bivariate correlation test where 
we observe a moderate positive association between growth rate and PE stake. 
 
To check the robustness of our regression results on how board size has a negative 
relationship with ROE, we extend the analysis to include listed firms on the Ghana stock 
exchange. Here we add all the three control variables and controlled for 2015 growth rate in 
the second regression analysis. From the table in appendix ii (b), we observe at a 95% 
confidence level, there exist a negative relationship between board size and ROE. The 95% 
confidence level is the same with or without growth rate as a control variable. The results are 
consistent with earlier correlation and regression analysis in the PE industry. Here, age tends 
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to be the only significant control variable in the board size effect analysis. This presupposes 
that the performance of recipients is higher for old firms than for young firms. We believe this 
is the normal thing because young firms usually embark on investment activities which 
reduces their accounting performance although their growth rate and operating performances 
will be high. 
6.5 Chapter summary 
We presented the findings in this chapter. On financial performance, we find that PE 
investment has a significant positive impact on recipient firms’ performance but there is no 
difference between the performance of PE firms and listed firms. Also, the proportion of the 
PE stake held by private investors positively affect the financial performance of the recipient 
firms. These findings still hold even after controlling for firms’ specific characteristics; size 
and industry. These findings are largely according to our expectation. On governance 
mechanism, we find that, the involvement of a founders in management has a strong positive 
relationship with ROE with a high significant level. Board size also has a strong negative 
relationship with performance.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
7.0 Introduction 
We discuss the findings of the study as presented in the previous chapter while relating them 
to the underlying theories and previous research works. 
7.1 Private equity and overall performance of recipient firms 
We measure overall financial performance in terms of profitability and efficiency. The 
discussion on the explored association between PE investment and recipient firms’ 
performance are as follows: 
Firstly, we compare the performance of PE recipient firms and listed firms. The descriptive 
statistics presented in the previous section reveal that on average, PE investors earn above 
twice as the return on equity investors earn from listed firms. However, the t-test reveals no 
significant difference. Also, the PE backed firms exhibit higher growth than listed firms. On 
growth, the results show that recipient firms are relatively younger than the listed firm and 
hence the difference is not over-striking. The bivariate correlation analysis explores a positive 
moderate association between PE stake and ROE.  Also, PE has a positive moderate 
association with growth rate. A further regression of ROE on PE stake with and without 
controls (size, industry and age) proves that PE stake has significant influence on performance 
of recipient firms. This finding is consistent with Meles et al. (2014) and Jain and Kini (1995) 
findings that, PE-backed firms outperform other firms. Also, the finding is in line with the 
studies of other scholars (Kim & Cho 2009; Ueda 2004 and Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009; 
Boucley et al. 2011 and Chunj 2011). These scholars observed that, through PE recipient 
firms significantly improve their returns and efficiency.  
This finding has a phenomenal resource implication as one recipient noted “…for the past 
three years, considering the difficulty in raising funds from banks and financial institutions, 
we have relied heavily on PE funding to keep the business running”. “The entrepreneurial 
firms do confirm how our involvement has enhanced their performance not only through fund 
committed but also through our managerial and operational advice, strategic involvement and 
governance systems” a fund manager noted. Again, an entrepreneur noted that “…currently, 
our financial performance has improved more than a competitor-who is a friend and started 
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operations in the same year as we did and apparently with similar resource challenges.  But I 
do attribute this success to the PE funds infusion which graced our innovative ideas” In this 
regard, PE investment facilitates the commercialisation of entrepreneurial ideas and growth of 
financially distressed firms through fund manager’s dynamic expertise, networks, knowledge 
and other skill-sets which are instrumental in the beneficiary firms’ performance. In a 
practical perspective, an example is of PE ability to improve the operations of firms through 
what the Private Equity Council, (2015) classified as the 4Cs: capabilities, clarity, culture, and 
capital. Previous finding including Kaplan & Schoar (2005), Hoskisson et al. (2013) and 
Klonowski (2011) argue that PE funding is concomitant with expertise and knowledge that 
enable recipient firms achieve superior performance. Our findings therefore support the 
argument of these scholars and confirms that, PE investors and fund managers having 
accumulated specific industry knowledge and expertise tends to provide detailed and 
professional guidance to recipient firms. This creates value and also enhances financial 
performance of recipient firms. 
 
Secondly, we measure how the stake of ownership acquired by PE investors affect the overall 
financial performance of recipient firms. The correlation analysis shows no strong statistically 
significant association between ROE, growth rate and PE stake. PE stake however has a 
positive moderate association with growth rate. A further regression of ROE on PE stake with 
and without control (industry) still confirms the positive significant relationship between PE 
stake and recipient firms’ performance. These relationships, to our expectations was not 
overwhelming. From transaction cost perspective, our finding supports the assertion that, 
transaction cost is reduced by more efficient institutions (Williamson, 2000) and where 
institutions are inefficient, majority stake provides a superior form of governance (Battistin, 
2006).  
Although the fund managers admitted during the interview sessions in playing imperative 
roles in financing, operations, strategies and governance activities of recipient firms, the legal 
restriction on the private ownership stake (maximum of 49%) in the country may limit such 
influences to a certain extent. Cross verification of the results with interviews conducted 
further validates the results in the regression analysis. “Private equity investors undoubtedly 
have enhanced our performance in various respect, and with our arching need in seeking 
repairs to our over indebted balance sheet, we would want to give more stake to them but the 
legal clause of 49% maximum is a limitation” an entrepreneur noted.  Also, “…with respect 
to the relatively weak and inefficient legal protections for minority interest in the country, we 
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prefer having a higher stake of ownership in the recipient firms to enhance governance and 
oversight and reduce agency cost” a fund manager noted. These findings attest to the 
significant influence of institutions restricting PE investments in the country. Almost 90 
percent of the PE firm respondents confirmed during the interview session that, they need to 
enhance their oversight mechanisms to curb agency problems and that would be possible only 
through acquiring higher stake. Based on this finding we therefore accept hypothesis H1.  
 
Altogether, we observe that the PE funding influences overall financial performance 
positively. Also, ownership stake has a positive significant relationship between PE stake and 
recipient firms’ performance hence we accept H1. Considering the legal limitation of the 
maximum ownership stake, it is difficult to predict the net effect of this positive significant 
relationship between PE stake and recipient firms’ performance should the threshold of 
ownership increases. Perhaps such relationship might change. In the next section, we proceed 
to reflect on the findings related to board size and founder management as corporate 
governance proxies. 
7.2 Corporate governance and private equity performance 
As mention earlier, the second objective of this study is to assess corporate governance 
impact on the performance of PE recipients’ by using board size and the involvement of 
founder in management as measures for corporate governance. We observe consistent results 
from the use of correlation and regression techniques. Also, the findings are in line with the 
interviews conducted with PE fund managers and recipients. 
 
We analyse how the involvement of the founder/entrepreneur in management affects 
performance. The result from this analysis is also consistent with both correlation and 
regression analyses. Also, the positive relationship between founder involvement and 
performance is in line with the views shared by fund managers. In effect, we are saying that 
the involvement of founders in running of firms or the co-ownership by top managers has 
positive impact on the performance of recipient firms. The finding is consistent with the PE 
model for corporate governance in developed countries which highlights co-ownership by top 
management and founder involvement (Wruck, 2008). The author further emphasises that co-
ownership by top management help increase the profitability and overall financial 
performance of recipients.  The result is also in line with the other empirical research works 
on how entrepreneur-CEOs/ founder-led firms impact firm performance in other industries 
 60 
 
(e.g., Randøy & Goel,2003; Adams et al, 2009; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Randøy et al,2013.). We 
could explain this relationship using agency theory.  From the agency and corporate 
governance perspectives, the interest of investors, management and/or founders will be 
aligned to promote superior performance. This is because the concentrated nature of 
ownership and management in recipient firms will help lower agency cost to promote superior 
performance (Randøy & Goel, 2003; Cumming et al.,2007).   A fund manager opined that, 
“…most recipient firms are family-owned business which were ran to suit the preference of 
the owners”. Therefore, fund managers must ensure that their interest and that of the 
recipients are aligned to impact firm performance. Moreover, the innovation and ideas behind 
these recipient firms are borne by the founders which will drive the firm to its anticipated 
level. Also, the founders may have established links and networks which may be sustaining 
the business operation, hence their continual involvement in management may be critical. 
Thus, in a way the attitude of founders has an impact on overall performance. As noted by 
one fund manager, “…we found one instance where the promoter who was also the chief 
executive had proven beyond reason doubt that he is not the person to take the firm to level 
that we anticipated so we asked him to step down or stop committing funds to the 
investment”. Based on this finding we therefore accept hypothesis H2.  
 
Concerning board size effect, we find a negative relationship between board size and 
performance. The finding is in conformity with that of Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996) and 
Eisenberg et al. (1998). Most importantly, in the context of PE, the finding is consistent with 
the suggestion given by Wruck (2008) that smaller board size have a positive impact on 
performance. The result therefore implies that recipients can achieve superior performance 
(ROE) when they ensure a smaller board size. We believe that various reasons may account 
for this relationship especially when it comes to the PE industry. Ghana as a common-law 
country generally should emphasis the protection of minority especially when it comes to 
private investments. However, the institutional lax persisting in the country makes it difficult 
for fund managers to protect their interest without any pragmatic actions. As a fund manager 
noted, “…there is no specific law regulating the PE industry”. It is therefore prudent for 
investors to ensure that they are represented on the board of recipient firms. Fund managers 
may also insist on the appointment of independent directors on the board. The board 
representation and the inclusion of independent directors may have implications from agency 
theory. As Eisenberg et al., (1998) suggest, the agency problems resulting from board size 
may reduce in firms with smaller boards  
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It has been noted that, large board size is associated with increased coordination cost, 
communication difficulties and increased exploitation power for the CEO/chairman of the 
board (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). Thus, the presence of a large board size will 
affect the ability of directors to efficiently and effectively monitor top management. This 
invariably may cancel out the important impact that board existence has on firm performance.  
A smaller board will allow directors to familiarise themselves with each other for effective 
and efficient discussions from their deliberations (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) which helps 
improve the firm performance. In the PE industry, Wruck (2008) suggests five to eight 
members, however, we believe this may be too large for Ghana’s (and some emerging 
markets) PE industry given the smaller nature of the recipient firms. Hence putting all 
together, we find a negative relationship between board size and return on equity, we 
therefore accept hypothesis H3. Perhaps as shared by all the interviewed fund managers, “the 
private equity industry is very small and still in its embryonic stage”, therefore the board size 
effect will change when the industry grows or the effect will persist no matter the stage the 
industry will find itself in. 
The findings of our study are robust and empirically supported across the various quantitative 
and qualitative techniques used in analysing the data. 
7.3 Chapter summary 
PE funding positively influences overall financial performance of recipient firms. Also, the 
ownership stake owned by the PE investors has a positive significant impact on the financial 
performance of the recipient firms. The involvement of founders in management strongly 
influence the financial performance of the recipient firms positively. Conversely, large boards 
mar PE recipient firms’ financial performance. These findings are theoretically and 
empirically supported. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
8.0 Introduction 
Most emerging markets present new investment opportunities and some growth prospects that 
attracts PE investors. There has therefore been a growing interest in most emerging markets 
by PE investors. Although studies on PE have been well advanced in developed economies, 
there is limited focus on PE implications for emerging markets firms. We conduct our study 
on PE and corporate governance implications for emerging markets using Ghana as a case 
study. Our research focuses on how PE funding impact overall financial performance of 
recipients in emerging markets as well as how corporate governance affects such 
performance. The study fills an important gap in literature relating to impact of PE funding in 
emerging markets. It provides empirical evidence on recipient firm’s financial performance 
and how corporate governance mechanisms do affect such performance. We adopt a mixed 
methodology in analysing the data. 
8.1 Summary of findings and conclusion 
We find that, PE backed firms have relatively higher ROE and growth rate than listed firms 
though the differences are not statistically significant which is partly limited by our small 
sample size and the corresponding low level of statistical power. Recipient firms with higher 
PE stake have high ROE and growth rate than recipient firms with small PE ownership stake. 
We also find that PE recipient firms that involve the founders in management irrespective of 
the stake are highly efficient in terms of ROE. Another finding on the board size of PE 
recipient firms supports the argument that, large board size influences financial performance 
negatively. We therefore conclude that infusion of PE funds, through minority or majority 
stake, invariably, has a positive influence on recipient firms’ financial performance and higher 
ownership stake enhances such stimuli. Also, corporate governance mechanisms play a major 
role in enhancing the relationship between PE and recipient firms’ financial performance. Our 
findings are robust and as well, they are empirically and theoretically supported. 
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8.2 Implications 
Our findings have important policy and practical implications for policymakers and the 
players in the PE industry. Firstly, policymakers should be aware of the trend of PE investors 
interest in acquiring majority stake and match it with the unlimited demand for the limited 
supply of capital in Ghana. Considering the institutional inefficiencies and limited protection 
of minorities in the country, acquiring a smaller proportion of recipient firms could unsettle 
some investor. Investors may worry that minority stake would leave them without enough 
influence on the recipient firms. Therefore, there is a tendency for PE investors to offset the 
risk of not having full control by forcing firms to accept low valuation on the stake they put 
up for sale. In effect, investors may generate high return at the detriment of recipient firm’s 
long terms growth and profitability. These have strong implications for; policymakers in the 
institutional context (amendment of the maximum stake threshold and the enhancement of 
institutional efficiencies) and the investors and the recipient of funds in the context of PE 
(enhancing long term success of firms and stakeholders which is the spearheading relevance 
of PE as a financial model) 
 
The implication for the board size effect is that PE investors must be weary of the need to 
seek more board representations and appointment of more outside/ independent directors as 
means of curbing agency problems. Recipients’ must adopt a board size which is in line with 
their firm size. The size of the board must not be increased at the blind side of recipients’ 
financial performance. Finally, founder management variable and its relationship with 
recipient’ financial performance may also have implications for the PE industry. There is the 
need for investors to consider the overall motivation that founders bring on board and its 
effect on firms’ financial performance. Founders/entrepreneurs must therefore be given the 
opportunity to actively get involve in the management to help ensure the continuity of 
innovations and inventions.  However, there must be a limit to the founders’ involvement as 
there is the tendency for some founders to seek their own personal interest which may mar 
overall performance. 
8.3 Limitations of the study 
It is a fact that every research work is not without certain limitations, and our research is not 
an exception. An important limitation that needs not be overlooked is the small number of 
recipient firms used as a sample for the study. Given the lack of database for the PE industry 
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in Ghana, the sample used may not be a perfect representation of PE recipients in the country. 
This may affect the generalisability of our findings for other emerging markets. 
8.4 Recommendations for further studies 
The findings of this study paves way for further studies to be undertaken. A longitudinal 
research may be conducted, where the impact of the PE funding on recipients is assessed over 
time. This may be worthwhile as financial performance may change overtime. The 
explanatory variable such as PE investors stake may also change as the years go by as well as 
the corporate governance variables. Longitudinal studies would be able to detect PE effects 
over a period of time hence such studies are encouraged for future studies. 
 
Again, using non-recipient firms of PE as a matched sample will set the pace for a new 
direction of analysis. By comparing these two distinct firms, it will help ascertain the extent to 
which PE adds value to their recipient firms. 
 
Moreover, similar study on this topic could explore more explanatory variables. Other 
corporate governance variables such as board composition, board independence and 
performance rewards for senior managements. When assessing overall performance, the 
inclusion of amount invested as explanatory variable may also be worthwhile. This is 
because, PE funding comes with both financial and human resources and thus the amount 
invested will help assess how the financial resources brought in by the investors do affect 
recipients’ performance. 
 
Finally, similar study could be conducted with data from different country or countries to help 
test the reliability and validity of the findings of this study. 
8.5 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we came out with conclusions from the discussion of our findings. 
Implications of the findings were also presented for policymaker and the PE industry as a 
whole. Certain limitations of the study were also presented and we also set the agenda for 
further research. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: VIF result 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Industry    
PE_stake 
Age 
Board_size 
DM_Founder_mgt 
Age 
1.00 
1.00     
1.40 
1.40 
1.28 
1.28 
0.998153 
0.998153 
0.715490 
0.715490 
0.780538 
0.780538 
 
 
Appendix II: Results of robustness checks 
Robustness check: Regression of growth rate on equity stake 
 GR_2015 GR_2015 GR_2015 GR_2015 
PE_stake 
 
Size 
 
Industry 
 
Age 
 
_cons 
 
R2 
F-statistic 
N 
0.230     
(2.23)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.515   
(3.21)***                                                      
0.19      
4.96**    
23                           
0.202     
(1.77)*     
-0.022  
 (0.63) 
                       
 
 
 
0.777   
(1.74)*     
0.21        
2.61    
23                                                                                                             
0.234 
(2.26)**  
 
 
0.266  
(0.93)        
 
 
0.509     
(3.16)*** 
0.22         
2.90*      
23                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
0.1401 
(1.24) 
 
 
 
 
0.261 
(1.65) 
-0.268 
(0.54) 
0.29 
4.04** 
23
                                                * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Robustness check: Further analysis of the effect of board size on financial performance 
of both listed and private equity firms 
 ROE ROE 
Board size 
 
Size 
 
Age 
 
Industry 
 
GR_2015 
 
_cons 
 
R2 
F-statistic 
N 
-0.533       
(2.04)**  
-0.011      
(0.45)    
0.209  
(2.59)*** 
0.082 
(0.64)       
 
 
0.611    
(1.83)*        
0.19      
2.82**   
54                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
-0.527 
(2.02)** 
-0.008 
(0.32) 
0.188         
(2.28)**                            
0.861 
(0.67) 
0.180 
(1.11)                                                                                           
0.590 
(1.77)*             
0.21      
2.52**     
54                                                                                    
                                                    * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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APPENDIX III 
REFLECTIVE NOTES 
 
Written by: Prince Baah-Peprah 
1.0 Introduction  
In this reflective note, I present the findings and conclusion of this thesis and touch on the 
issues relating to the themes: innovation, responsibility and internationalization. 
 
2.0 Summary of thesis findings and conclusion 
The main theme of the study is “the impact of private equity (PE) on firms in emerging 
markets: evidence from Ghana”. The study used a multi-approach data collection techniques 
to collect primary and secondary data and adopted a mixed methodology in analysing the 
impact of PE on financial performance of recipient firms. The study finds that, PE backed 
firms have relatively higher return on equity (ROE) and growth rate than listed firms. The 
study further revealed that, recipient firms with higher PE ownership stake have significant 
higher ROE and growth rate than recipient firms with small PE ownership stake. On 
governance mechanisms, the study used founder management and board size as proxies to 
investigate how corporate governance affects the financial performance of the recipient firms.  
It was found that, PE recipient firms that involve the founders in management irrespective of 
the PE ownership stake are highly efficient in terms of ROE. It was also found that, large 
board size influences ROE negatively. Based on these findings, the study concluded that, 
infusion of PE funds, through minority or majority ownership stake, invariably, has a positive 
influence on recipient firms’ financial performance but higher stake enhances such stimuli. 
Also, corporate governance mechanisms enhance the positive relationship between PE and 
financial performance of recipient firms but subject to small board size and founder 
involvement in management. 
 
3.0 Innovation 
A long-standing controversy exit as to whether PE enhances the innovative ideas of 
entrepreneurs in the long run. Critics argue on the grounds of “myopia” and suggest that PE 
investors sacrifice the long-term value-adding expenditures such as R&D in the quest of 
smoothing earnings within the life time of their investments (average of five-to-seven-year).  
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Though ROE is positively related to PE according to this study, the relationship can be partly 
ascribed to the owners’ adapted innovation strategy prior to the PE funds infusion. Also, the 
firms’ financial performance might have been influenced by innovation strategy introduced 
by PE investors in commercializing the existing entrepreneurs’ innovative ideas. The 
relationship between the two is often simultaneous and tricky to conclude without empirical 
studies. Generally, PE (venture capital) investors do nurture innovation in start-ups. This can 
be witnessed in the increasing number of born-global firms in developed markets. Most 
studies on PE in developed market confirm that, based on the ownership stake acquired by PE 
investors as well as their industry knowledge of entrepreneurs’ core business operations, they 
install innovation processes such as; idea generation and evaluation processes, prototyping, 
testing, validation, and commercialization. But this association may not directly be replicated 
in emerging markets considering the vast difference in developed and emerging markets’ 
institutions and economic development. For example, a typical evidence of institutional 
inefficiency was revealed during the interview sessions when respondents in pharmaceutical 
sector expressed their concern on the lack of sufficient protection of intellectual property 
rights such as patent (which is an outcome of investors’ toil and sacrifice of short-term returns 
for investments in R&D). Also, particularly in small firms in markets with weak institutions 
(most emerging markets), uncertainty and informational gaps may affect innovative 
investments since it is difficult to curb agency problems such as moral hazard and information 
asymmetries. Implicitly, I assume that, PE is well suited form of funding in nurturing and 
financing innovative young firms in markets where institutions are efficient.  
 
Therefore, innovation in firms in emerging markets should be a strategic priority of 
policymakers regarding institutional changes. But these changes should be accomplished 
without diluting the founders’ ownership stake. As this study confirms, founders’ original 
innovative ideas are imperative and their involvement in strategic decisions significantly 
influences financial performance and growth. This been said, the institutional changes could 
be achieved by establishing collective organizations such as technological centres that 
promote collaborative innovation and generic R&D programs among entrepreneurs and PE 
investors. I suggest that, policymakers of emerging markets could establish organisations 
solely responsible for intensive scrutiny of business plans of potential start-ups. A pool of 
attractive start-ups may then be made available to the public. With that, PE investors (local 
and foreign) and general partners with high-tech innovative ideas could identify suitable firms 
where they can deploy their competences and enhance both innovation and profitability. 
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4.0 Responsibility 
PE as a financial model has been accustomed with the role of funding start-ups, private 
middle-markets, financially distressed firms, as well as public firms in need of buyout. But, 
PE investors have been severely criticised for exploiting recipient firms especially in 
emerging markets. Critics argue that, investors through strict corporate governance 
mechanisms gain excessive power and thereafter engage in firms stripping and quick flips that 
are detrimental to the firms’ success in the long-run. Presumably, various actions 
implemented by PE investors are not solely because of their selfish interest of earning higher 
returns within the life time of their investments. These strict corporate governance 
mechanisms on the other hand, could be direct responses to the intuitional environment in the 
host country as well as the peculiar characteristics and behaviour exhibited by recipient firms 
during post-investment period. Most firms especially in less developed markets are entangled 
with unnecessary operating peripherals in their supply chain that add no value. An example in 
our case is a family firm that prior to PE funding, found it difficult to change a supplier and 
lay off redundant employees just because of family ties.  
I therefore assume that investors strict oversight mechanisms cut cost and largely enhance 
financial performance which in a whole benefit all stakeholders. Nevertheless, I suggest that, 
the investors should not serve as a disability to recipient firms by focusing on their short term 
returns but should facilitate initiating phases of entrepreneurship in firms and further back 
them to go through their growth cycles.  Suggestions on institutions such as those proposed in 
the innovation section would be useful here as well to enable PE fulfil its spearheading 
responsibility of funding financially distressed firms and nurturing young innovative firms. 
 
5.0 Internationalization 
Emerging markets account for a significant proportion of the global population and hence 
have become critical nodes in the global economic system. Therefore, growth of firms in 
these markets has a significant influence on international business. A critical factor marring 
the performance of firms in emerging markets is inadequate capital. Deducing from the 
concept of born-global firms, entrepreneurs in emerging markets with innovative ideas that 
are appealing to international investors and customers can turn their ideas into a 
commercialized concept and sell beyond their local boundaries if adequately funded. 
International PE investors therefore play an eminent role by enabling local firms gain access 
to international networks that catapult them beyond their local markets. Start-up firms aiming 
to step above bootstrapping stage, eying to sell their products and services globally and 
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subsequently get listed through initial public offerings (IPOs) must therefore subject 
themselves to; transparency, integrity and accountability as these factors boost foreign PE 
investors’ confidence in firms. Emerging market firms engaging the services of 
internationally reputable accounting and audit firms would be a step in the right direction to 
source international PE funds and sell their products and services without boundaries. 
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Reflective note 
 by: Priscilla Serwaah 
 
1.0 Introduction 
By this reflective note, I seek to discuss the findings of the master thesis in relation to the 
three broad themes of University of Agder, which are internationalization, innovation and 
responsibility. Firstly, I will present the findings of the study. 
 
2.0 Summary of thesis findings and conclusion 
This study was conducted on the topic: the impact of private equity (PE) funding on recipient 
firms in emerging economies. The study sought to assess how PE funding affect the financial 
performance of recipient firms and how through corporate governance mechanisms such 
financial performance of recipients may be impacted. An analysis of the data through both 
quantitative and qualitative methods showed that PE funding has a positive influence on 
recipients’ financial performance when the investors have a higher equity stake in recipients’ 
businesses. By corporate governance, it was revealed that the involvement of the founders of 
the recipients’ in management activities do affect recipient’ financial performance positively 
whereas a larger board size mars the financial performance of recipient firms. In conclusion, 
the acquisition of higher equity stake by PE investors impact recipients’ financial 
performance positively. Again, through effective and efficient corporate governance 
mechanisms PE funding would enhance recipients’ financial performance. 
 
3.0 Internationalization 
Private equity funding may be seen as a tripartite relationship between limited partners, 
general partners (fund managers) and recipients. Although technically both limited partners 
and general partners are together the investors, I will be focusing much attention on the 
general partners as they have closer relationships with recipients and the limited partners tend 
to be ‘just’ providers of funds. 
Thus, as fund managers (general partners) source funding from limited partners for onward 
investment in recipient firms, they may face challenges when it comes to the financial 
markets. The fundraising activities of fund managers in emerging economies are usually 
inadequate for onward investments. Hence most fund managers depend on other foreign 
sources of funding. Indeed, PE investment is projected to increase in emerging economies and 
the inadequate sources of local funding will force fund managers to compete with other 
 83 
 
sectors to seek funds overseas. Foreign sources of funding may come from donor agencies 
and individuals and development financial institutions. Microfinance industry could be a key 
competitor for fund managers in the sourcing of foreign funds. Thus, the extent to which fund 
managers ensure efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, sanity and sustainability in their 
activities will determine their ability to raise more funds overseas. By acquiring higher stakes 
in recipients’ firms, fund managers can effectively and efficient monitor the businesses and 
drive it towards achieving superior performance as suggested by this study and other research 
works. 
 
3.0 Innovation 
Private equity involves providing funds to unlisted firms who are usually small-scale 
business. The investors thus acquire equity stake in the recipient firms’. However, the equity 
position acquired by the investors may serve as a hindrance to potential small-scale 
businesses. From the interviews conducted one fund manager noted that “… most businesses 
tend not to appreciate the fact that it is good to owe say 10% of a bigger pie that to keep a 
small pie to yourself 100%”. There is the notion among such businesses that when one 
receives funds from PE investors, it will pave way for the investors to take over his/her 
business. I therefore believe that for PE investors to affect changes in more businesses in 
emerging economies and their respective countries, they could offer more debt capital. 
According to corporate finance literature, debt holders may also be seen as owners of a firm. 
This is because in times of bankruptcy total ownership will go to debtholders. Such 
innovative meaning of funding recipients will make available to them cheap means of long 
term funding compared to bank loans which are usually short term in nature. The provision of 
more debt capital by the investors may be organised in a similar way as equity capital where 
investors bring professionalism, expertise and other resources needed to achieve superior 
performance. Effective monitoring and control may also be achieved using debt covenants 
which will either restrict certain activities of recipients or mandate them to undertake certain 
activities.  
 
4.0 Responsibility 
Private equity funding comes with financial, human and other resources to improve 
recipients’ financial performance. There is usually a time limit of at most ten years at which 
the investors will sell out their equity stake through initial public offering, buy-outs etc. In the 
hindsight, there is the tendency for investors to be only interested in high returns prior to exit 
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without caring about recipients’ performance after exiting and in the long. This is an ethical 
challenge which if it persists at the back of fund managers’ minds will affect the overall 
sustainability of recipient firms. Fund managers may undertake high risk investments which 
will be only beneficial in the short term. It therefore beholds on investors to deliver not only 
high returns but also leave a positive impact on those who benefit from their funds and 
expertise. This study shown that recipient firms achieve superior financial performance when 
founders/entrepreneurs are involved in management. I believe this may be a means of curbing 
the ethical challenge raised. By so doing the interest of investors seeking high returns are 
aligned with the founder/entrepreneur’s wish of achieving both superior performance and 
sustainability of his/her business. 
 
 
